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This study attempts to analyze the efficiency of intervention policy in Turkey during the period 
between 4.1.2005 and 31.12.2012 with a sub period which is between 4.1.2007 and 31.12.2010. 
For our study purpose, therefore we investigated how interventions with pre-announced auctions 
as a whole influence the exchange rates. Further, we analyze whether there is an asymmetric 
effect among the buying and selling transactions with respect to their impact on the exchange 
rates. In the study, the E-GARCH model is employed to find the asymmetric effect. The final 
object of this study is whether buying auctions which are conducted to serve for only purpose of 
increasing international reserves influence the exchange rates. We evaluate the efficiency of 
transactions in the same direction of central bank statements. In conclusion, the findings did not 
amount to any significant impact of total transaction on exchange rates. The study findings also 
suggest that there is asymmetric effect among the selling and buying transactions. The amounts 
of selling transaction have a negative impact on both level and volatility while buying auctions 
did not have any significant effect on them. As a new research result, we found that buying 
auctions served well with respect to their contributions to reserves while they do not influence 
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The foreign exchange market intervention is defined as sale or purchase of foreign assets against the 
domestic ones by Central banks. In other words, any action taken by an agent of 
the governments usually thorugh central banks is aimed to influence exchange rates. Central banks intervene 
foreign exchange markets by sterilize and unsterilize interventions but also interventions can be classified as 
secret and reported interventions. They try to affect exchange rates through three channels;Portfolio, signaling 
and noise trading channel. Before Bretton Woods exchange system was abandoned , countries used whenever 
they felt that they needed to make interventions in order to keep exchange rates under certain predetermined 
exchange rate band . However, since the breakdown the Bretton Woods, foreign exchange market 
interventions  have become discretionary policy instruments. Even though, many studies have been made on 
effect and efficiency of foreign market operations, findings   from the them are in conflict. Some argue that 
interventions in foreign market does not have effect on level but increases volatility in exchange rates while 
others supports interventions since they believe interventions influence  level of exchange rates and decrease 
volatility as IMF Executive Board  suggested its member countries that they should intervene to counter 
disorderly market conditions. The controversial issue regarding the efficiency and effects of central 
banks's intervention policies is one of the reason why I want to study on efficiency of intervention. Another 
reason is that although many research  have been  made and findings have been presented, there is relatively 
small amount of  research and study on effects of exchange rate interventions in emerging countries. Apart 
from this,in Turkey there is reserve accumulution policy launched by the  begining of 2002. For this purposes, 
central bank started to conduct buyin auctions. Since central bank states that buying auction are conducted for 
only purposes of increasing internation reserves without resulting in any changes in volatility or level of 
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Regarding the econometric model, I am going to use E-GARCH model in order to observe 
both total impact of interventions and analyze whether there is a difference in with respect to 
impact of sales and purchases transactions on exchange rate’s level and volatility.  In the study, daily 
indicative selling exchange rates of USD/TRY parity are employed for the exchange rate data. Also 
we take into account that all direct interventions and pre-announced auctions through sales or 
purchasing of USD dollars were conducted in USD during the period between 4.1.2005 and 
31.12.2012. Main data source for our study is the database of Central Bank of Turkey Republic.  
1. Hypothesis #1: Total Net Amount of the Intervention Operations by Central Bank of Turkey 
Republic  did not affect on level of exchange rates but decreased volatility of exchange rates 
in a period between 4.1.2005 and 31.12.2012 
2. Hypothesis #2: There is no  difference between purchase and sales transactions with respect 
to their impact on level and volatility of exchange rate  
3. Hypothesis #3: buying auction did affect neither on level nor volatility of Exchange rates in a  
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   Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Since the mid-1970s, after the abandonment in 1973 of the Bretton Woods System, which 
required countries to peg their exchange rates, most developed countries have shifted their 
exchange rate regime from an adjustable peg exchange one to a pure floating regime in 
which exchange rates are determined by supply and demand in the international exchange 
rate market. During the period of Bretton Woods, policymakers used the intervention option 
solely for maintaining rates in a predetermined parity whilst, during the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods, a discretionary policy with regard to foreign exchange interventions was 
employed, i.e., one was performed whenever a country’s policymaker felt it should be done. 
In fact, because the protection of Bretton Woods against short-term capital movements was 
removed, policymakers had to protect their own country’s currency values against rapid and 
sudden capital changes through interventions on the foreign market exchange. Because of the 
increase in capital movements and the increase in volume and importance of the foreign 
exchange rates, this led to increased uncertainty, resulting in high volatility of exchange 
rates. Therefore, policymakers have become more cautious regarding possible negative 
effects of rapid changes in capital movements. The increasing importance and common usage 
of official interventions since the 1970s have made it one of the most addressed topics in the 
fields of economics and finance.  Even though policymakers view interventions in foreign 
exchange markets as useful policy, not only for influencing levels of exchange rates but also 
for reducing volatility of rates, the literature demonstrates no consensus regarding the 
efficiency of official interventions,, and foreign exchange intervention is considered a highly 
controversial policy. Some view intervention as not only ineffective policy for affecting 
foreign exchange rate level but also as actually increasing volatility in rates.  Others, 
however, argue that intervention policy does impact level and does reduce volatility of 
exchange rates. Nevertheless, some researchers feel that intervention policies are a waste of 
time since they affect neither level nor volatility of foreign exchange rates (Dominguez, 
1993).  
The main objective of this thesis is to study the efficiency of official interventions 
implemented by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (henceforth, CBRT) and to 
apply a fresh perspective to the literature regarding the efficiency and effects of such 




many studies have already been performed in the context of developed economies, small 
attention has been given to their efficacy in emerging countries. Therefore, we intend to 
contribute to the existing literature a study related to an emerging country and, at the same 
time, provide policymakers of such countries with useful information regarding the 
efficiency and effects of foreign exchange interventions on exchange rates as a viable policy. 
This study will then explore the impact of official interventions as a whole (i.e., including 
direct interventions and auctions) with respect to the USD/TRY rate level and will analyze in 
detail whether interventions reduce volatility of USD/TRY. Besides the impact of the total 
number and kind of interventions on exchange rates and volatility, we will also try to 
determine whether a significant difference exists between foreign exchange buying and 
selling transactions with respect to their impacts on exchange rate level. Lastly, as a new 
contribution, our study will investigate the efficiency of foreign exchange buying auctions 
under a moderate reserve policy in Turkey. For these purposes, our study will employ the E-
GARCH model. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two presents a literature review. In addition to 
sub-sections on findings and results from previous studies regarding foreign exchange 
intervention policy, the historical background of interventions from the 1970s through today 
and the reasons for them will be included. We will discuss some types of interventions and 
the general theories of intervention channels that the central bank has used to affect exchange 
rates. Lastly, we will review previous studies in advanced economies and in emerging 
countries. Then, we will provide the existing literature on the foreign exchange history in 
Turkey. The subsequent section is called Data and Methodology. In it we state data and the 
model that we will use in our empirical research for our hypotheses mentioned previously. 








Central Bank Interventions 
2.1 Foreign Exchange Interventions 
The literature contains some similar definitions of official foreign exchange market intervention, 
which is broadly defined as any transaction or announcement by an official agent of a 
government that is intended to influence the value of an exchange rate (Dominguez, 1993). 
Another definition includes such actions as buying or selling foreign exchange by monetary 
authorities against their own currency for the purpose of affecting the exchange rate (Sarno & 
Taylor, 2011). Although intervention decisions are often made by authorities in the ministry of 
finance or the treasury department, resultant actions are taken by central banks (Dominguez, 
1998). Intervention operations usually occur in the dealer markets even though each central bank 
has its own specific methods of intervention. Some central banks directly contact the foreign 
exchange desks of commercial banks to achieve maximum visibility while others prefer to 
intervene secretly so that market participants receive no information. 
The exchange rate in a floating rate system is expected to be determined by market 
supply and demand. But, Meese & Rogoff (1983) found that any structural exchange models are 
not superior to a random walk in explaining movements of exchange rates. Out of many other 
relevant studies, only a few were able to find any evidence showing the relation between 
economic fundamentals and exchange rates even in the long term. Mark (1995) showed that 
primary economic fundamentals have a positive impact on exchange rates only over long time 
periods. In short time periods, exchange rates deviate from the values which reflect the changes 
in economic fundamentals (Sarno & Taylor, 2001). Therefore, policymakers in monetary 
authorities are forced to intervene in foreign exchange markets to remedy the instability in 
exchange rates.  
The main motivations for central banks to intervene in foreign exchange markets are the 
following: 
 To affect level of the foreign exchange rates: If policymakers think that the 
exchange rate is significantly different from what it should be, central banks can 
intervene to affect its value. Because large deviations from required exchange rate 
values can negatively impact foreign trade or can have inflationist impacts on 
price levels.  
Chapter 2 Central Bank Interventions 
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 To reduce excessive volatility of foreign exchange rates: Since high volatility in 
foreign exchange rates can result in higher costs related to foreign trade, central 
banks intervene to reduce high variances in exchange rates and calm disorderly 
market conditions so that the size of their countries’ foreign trade is reduced. 
Countries where inflation targeting drives monetary policy and a high level of 
pass-through from exchange rates to domestic prices are more sensitive to 
changes in nominal exchange rates. 
 To provide foreign currency liquidity: Disorderly market conditions can result in 
lack of foreign currency liquidity, causing many financial institutions to suffer 
from lack of liquidity. Therefore, central banks intervene to increase liquidity for 
banks and other financial institutions so that they can meet their liabilities and 
obligations. 
 To increase foreign currency reserves: Central banks want to have a strong 
foreign currency reserve position in order to gain credibility and increase the 
ability to redeem debt in foreign currency or clear a debt.  Having strong currency 
reserves is more important in emerging countries where external or internal 
shocks are frequently seen.  
 To participate in coordinated and multinational interventions: Central banks can 
intervene collectively to support a particular currency. 
 To signal future monetary policy: Central banks sometimes prefer to use 
interventions as a signal for changes in the future monetary policy. 
2.2 Classification of Foreign Exchange Interventions  
In this section, we will present types of interventions employing various perspectives used by 
Agcaer (2003). Interventions are sorted according to sterilized-vs.-nonsterilized and secret-vs.- 
reported interventions. In addition, interventions can be classified as unilateral or coordinated 
and as in the same direction as movement of exchange rates or in the opposite direction as 
movements of exchange rates. 
2.2.1 Sterilized-vs.-Nonsterilized Interventions 
When a central bank decides to reduce the value of its own domestic currency, it buys a foreign 
currency and sells its own, leading to an increase in the domestic money supply. On the other 
hand, to increase the value of the domestic currency, the reverse transaction is performed, 
leading to a decrease in domestic money supply. A sterilized intervention occurs when a central 
bank acts simultaneously or with a very short lag time to offset the effects of changes in foreign 
Chapter 2 Central Bank Interventions 
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assets on the domestic monetary base (Sarno & Taylor, 2001). A nonsterilized intervention 
occurs when a central bank buys or sells foreign assets against domestic ones without any 
offsetting actions. Basically, nonsterilized interventions change the stock of base money, thereby 
changing the money supply and interest rates (Aguilar & Nydahl, 2000). As can be clearly 
seen, nonsterilized interventions are like any other open market operation with the exception that 
foreign assets are bought and sold rather than domestic ones (Dominguez, 1998).  
On the other hand, sterilized, official interventions include an offsetting domestic asset 
transaction so as to leave the monetary base unchanged. Transactions for sterilization can be 
made through buying and selling of domestic government securities or through repo transactions. 
As an example, when a monetary authority decides to intervene by selling foreign currency to the 
market, it will buy domestic currency from the market. The transaction is sterilized through an 
open market purchase of domestic government securities in order to leave the monetary base 
unchanged. Therefore, a sterilized intervention changes only the currency composition of 
domestic and foreign assets of private sector portfolio investments with a constant money supply 
(Aguilar & Nydahl, 2000). The difference between sterilized and nonsterilized interventions 




Figure 2.1: Balance Sheet of a Central Bank 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
-Net Foreign Assets 
    Gold 
    Foreign 
-Net Domestic Assets 
    Government Securities 
    Loans to commercial 
banks     
-Monetary Base 
   Currency in circulation 




                                                 
1
 This figure is courtesy Sarno & Taylor (2001). 
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To begin, the central bank’s balance sheet is as shown in Figure 2.1. On the asset side, 
foreign assets consist of gold and foreign currency bonds while domestic assets are domestic 
government bonds and loans to commercial banks. On the liability side, the monetary base 
consists of total currency and deposits held by commercial banks.
2
 Since both sides of the 
balance sheet are equal, we can formulate the equation as follows: 
Monetary Base (M) = Net Foreign Assets (NFA) + Net Domestic Assets (NDA) (2.1) 
When the central bank performs a foreign exchange market intervention, both sides of 
this balance sheet will change. For example, if the central bank decides to sell (buy) foreign 
assets, since net foreign assets decrease (increase), M will also decrease (increase) by the same 
amount so as to balance the sides of the balance sheet. Equation (2.2) shows how a sale of the 
foreign asset affects the elements on both sides of the balance sheet: 
↓ M= ↓ NFA+ NDA        (2.2) 
As mentioned earlier, this kind of intervention, which is nonsterilized, is very similar to open 
market operations with regard to their impacts on monetary base. 
On the other hand, when the intervention is sterilized, an offsetting transaction takes 
place. As an example of a selling intervention, the central bank can sterilize the intervention by 
buying domestic government bonds or domestic bills. Equations (2.3) and (2.4) describe how this 
type of sterilization works: 
-ΔNFA= ΔNDA         (2.3) 
↔ M= ↓ NFA+ ↑ NDA       (2.4) 
Sterilized interventions are usually preferred, especially in developed countries, because 
neutralizing the money-market effect of interventions prevents exchange rate policy from 
interfering with domestic monetary policy (Aguilar & Nydahl, 2000). There is a consensus that 
nonsterilized interventions affect exchange rates analogous to monetary policy, by modifying the 
monetary base through changes in monetary aggregates, interest rates, real demand for goods and 
assets, and expectations, all of which ultimately influence exchange rates. The impact of 
sterilized interventions on exchange rates is not clear and certain. In theory, sterilization affects 
them by changing the relative supply of domestic and foreign bonds or, if it cannot affect them 
through monetary channels because the monetary base is kept constant (Edison 1993), by 
                                                 
2
For simplicity, we assume that net worth equals zero. 
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changing expectations instead.  Since its impact on exchange rates is controversial, most of the 
studies made on efficiency of interventions have been devoted to analyzing the effects of 
sterilized interventions.  
2.2.2 Secret / Reported Interventions 
Nowadays, central banks, especially those located in developed countries, usually inform the 
public regarding foreign exchange interventions whereas until the beginning of the 1990s, they 
typically used secret interventions, i.e., those that the central bank does not make public 
(Dominguez, 1998). Dominguez & Frankel (1993b) present some motivations behind secret 
foreign interventions. 
 In case of interventions made by any authority other than the central bank, it can be 
aimed at restricting the effects of interventions 
 When exchange rate policy interferes with long-term monetary policies to protect 
credibility of central banks  
 A central bank of a certain country can be obliged to join interventions performed by 
other countries’ central banks because of political reasons 
 When exchange rates move strongly in one direction and the central bank intends to 
increase volatility of rates in order to show that the current tendency in exchange rates is 
actually weak   
 When volatility of exchange rates is high and credibility of the central bank is low, 
policymakers prefer intervention without notification of the public 
 Central banks can use secret interventions when they decide to change the level of 
international reserves 
By the beginning of the 1990s, central banks had begun to inform the public regarding the 
size and price of interventions. Therefore, data and information about interventions can now be 
found in the financial press, newspapers, and so on besides of official notifications made by 
central banks. 
2.2.3 Unilateral/Coordinated Interventions 
A central bank can intervene on its own to impact an exchange rate, or central banks sometimes 
prefer to intervene jointly, in other words, several national banks coordinate foreign exchange 
market interventions. Changing a particular exchange rate not only affects the exchange market 
of the country in which interventions are implemented but also other countries’ exchange 
markets. Therefore, central banks of some countries, especially those of developed countries, 
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will sometimes take coordinated actions to affect a particular exchange rate such as occurred 
with the Plaza Agreement of September 22, 1985, and the Louvre Accord of February 21 and 22, 
1987. Table 2.1 shows examples of coordinated interventions performed in the past. 
2.2.4 Leaning with the Wind and Leaning against the Wind  
Interventions which aim to support the direction of exchange rates are described as leaning with 
the wind. On the other hand, interventions to change the direction of exchange rates are termed 
leaning against the wind. However, determining the directions of exchange rate movement, 
especially when changes in exchange rates are particularly volatile, is sometimes difficult. 
Central banks usually apply interventions in opposite directions to stabilize exchange 
rates which are volatile. Also, central banks use this kind of intervention when they aim to signal 
future monetary policies.  
Table 2.1: Coordinated Interventions 
Date Central Banks  The Purpose of Intervention Type of the 
Intervention 
    
October 1974-     
March 1975 
FED, Bundesbank, 
Swiss National Bank 
To slow depreciation of the 
dollar 
To offset volatility in the 
dollar-Mark and dollar-
Swiss franc rates 
Purchase of the USD 
1978-1979 FED, Bundesbank, 
Swiss National 
Bank,BoJ 




G5 countries To weaken strong dollar Sales of USD against 
currencies of the rest 
of  G5 countries 
February1987 G7 countries To foster stability of FX rate Purchases of USD 








The Purpose of Intervention 
 
Type of the 
Intervention 
1988-1990 G7 countries To foster stability of ERs  Purchases and sales 
of USD 
1991-1992 FED, European Central 
Banks 
To foster stability of ERs 
around current levels   
to support dollar 
Purchases and Sales 
of D-Mark and JPY 
April 1994-
August 1995 
FED, BoJ, Bundesbank 
and other individual 
European Central Banks 
To support dollar Sales of D-Mark and 
JPY 
June 1998 FED, BoJ To support yen Purchase of JPY 
September 
2000 
FED, BoJ, ECB and 
other central banks in 
Europe 
To support Euro Purchase of EUR 
November 
2000 
ECB and other euro 
zone central banks 
To support Euro Purchase of EUR 
September 
2001 
BoJ, ECB and other 
euro zone central banks 
To weaken yen Sales of JPY for USD 
and EUR 
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2.3 Determinants of Exchange Rates 
Because determining exchange rates is not simple, there are many theories that try to explain 
these determinants. Basically, there are three main approaches—the parity condition approach 
(purchasing power parity), the asset market approach, and the balance of payment approach, and 
these can be viewed as complementary. Figure 2.2 shows exchange rate determinants with 
respect to these approaches.  




Figure 2.2: Determinants of Exchange Rates 
SPOT EXCHANGE RATES 
    
  Parity condition approach      Asset Market Approach                                 BoP Approach 
-Relative inflation rates         - Relative interest rates                         -Current account balances 
-Relative interest rates           -Prospects for economic growth          - Portfolio investment 
-Forward exchange rates       - Supply and demand for assets           - Foreign direct investment 
-Interest rate parity               - Outlook for political stability             - Exchange rate regimes 
                                  - Speculation and liquidity                   - Official monetary reserves 
                                              - Political risk and controls 
Before presenting the channels through which interventions affect exchange rates, we 
will discuss the theories that explain in detail exchange rate determinants. Below we also discuss 
the monetary approach in addition to those presented above. 
2.3.1 The Purchasing Power Parity Approach (Parity Condition Approach) 
The purchasing power parity (PPP) approach is the oldest and the most widely accepted 
approach among the other exchange rate determination approaches. Basically, this approach 
assumes that long-term exchange rates are determined by relative prices of foreign and domestic 
goods. In other words, changes in long-term exchange rates tend to reflect changes in relative 
prices of domestic and foreign goods. The theory assumes the “law of one price,” meaning that 
differences in prices of a certain good in different countries are eliminated by market agents. 
Otherwise, arbitrage will exist. Equation (2.5) helps us understand the PPP approach. 
  = ER x               (2.5) 
In equation (2.5),    is defined as a price of a good in terms of domestic currency,    is 
the price of the good in terms of a foreign currency, and a foreign exchange rate is the exchange 
rate between these two currencies. As we can see easily from the equation, the exchange rate is 
the relative price of the good in the home and foreign country. Although the PPP approach is a 
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reasonable explanation for the determination of exchange rates, it is not complete since it 
neglects transportation costs, tariffs, and other trade barriers. Also, it assumes all goods are 
traded internationally. Because of these disadvantages of the PPP approach, a more general 
version of it, called absolute purchasing power parity, was introduced. Absolute PPP takes into 
account only price levels and not the domestic and foreign price of a good. Although    and 
  in Equation (2.6) define consumer price indices in the home and a foreign country, 
respectively, in this approach, the logic is the same as in previous one. Therefore, the absolute 
PPP approach also neglects transportation costs, tariffs, and so on just as the standard PPP 
approach does. Since it is not possible to carry a good from one place to another one without any 
transportation costs or differentiations among the goods and good baskets in different countries, 
it is therefore difficult to state that absolute PPP approach will hold. A more general version of 
the PPP approach, relative purchasing power parity, gives a more reasonable explanation for 
determination of exchange rates. Basically, it argues that increases in exchange rates are 
reflected by increases in the differences between domestic and foreign price indices. Equation 
(2.6) formulates the theory of relative purchasing power parity, where and   and    are 
domestic and foreign consumer prices indices, respectively: 
  
 
    
 = (
  




    
 )       (2.6) 
where   
  and   
  are domestic and foreign consumer price indexes (CPIs), respectively, at time 
t, and    is the exchange rate as of time t. The time index t – 1 indicates the value of the price or 
exchange rate in the time period immediately prior to time t.  
2.3.2 The Balance of Payment (BoP) Approach 
The balance of payment is a method of recording all international money transactions of a 
country during a specific time period. The balance of payment includes current account, capital 
account, and the central bank transactions sections. The current account is formed by exports 
and imports of goods and services and transfers, while the capital account contains the portfolio 
and direct investments. Increases or decreases in foreign reserves are related to central bank 
transactions. According to the BoP approach, any change in exchange rates results from inflows 
or outflow in the balance of payment. Thus, the equilibrium exchange rate is determined by 
foreign currency inflows and outflows in the current account being balanced by foreign currency 
inflows and outflows in the capital account. 
 Before and also during the Bretton Woods system, the BoP approach was commonly used 
to explain determinants of exchange rates. After the breakdown of Bretton Woods, the portfolio 
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balance and the monetary approaches became more popular, and the BoP approach was 
considered less significant by researchers. 
2.3.3 The Monetary Approach 
Among economists, monetarism began to be popular in the 1970s, and common acceptance of 
the monetarism approach encouraged many economists to think that exchange rates were 
determined by supply and demand for domestic and foreign money or government bonds. In 
other words, the monetary approach argues that changes in exchange rates can be explained by 
changes in supply and demand for the money in the domestic and international markets. To 
better understand this approach, we can consult both of the quantity theory of money and 
purchasing power parity. As we can see from equation (2.7), the quantity theory of money argues 
that there is a strong relation between quantity of money and price levels. Thus an increase in the 
money supply leads to higher inflation and higher inflation depreciates the value of domestic 
money, resulting in purchasing power parity3:  
M x V = P x Y         (2.7) 
where M is the money supply, P is price level, Y is the real gross domestic product (GDP), V is 
the velocity of money,  
In the international context, this relation implies that an increase in money supply leads to higher 
inflation and lowered purchasing power parity, resulting in depreciation of exchange rates.  
2.3.4 The Portfolio Balance Approach 
The portfolio balance approach presents theoretical background for the portfolio balance channel 
through which sterilized interventions can influence the exchange rates. This approach is based 
on the assumption that investors diversify their portfolio assets to reduce risk by investing among 
different financial assets and also by investing in other countries. Investors invest in domestic 
and foreign money and bonds. Since any factor that changes distribution of the investments 
requires the investors to balance among their investments, changes in exchange rates result. For 
example, any change in the current account leads to changes in the distribution of investors’ 
portfolios. Then, investors try to achieve re-balance between foreign and domestic assets. During 
the balancing process, changes in the exchange rate occur and directly influence foreign trade, 
                                                 
3
 The formula in equation (2.7) was first introduced by Irving Fisher and was then developed by Milton Friedman. It 
describes the relation between domestic money supply and price levels. 
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and thus the current account. This reciprocal influence between current account and exchange 
rate continues until the exchange rate reaches an equilibrium point. 
The portfolio balance approach also assumes that domestic and foreign assets are not 
perfect substitutes for each other since they have different risk premiums and they provide 
investors with different returns. Therefore, risk-averse investors will redistribute their portfolios 
among domestic and foreign assets when a change in the expected return and risk of the domestic 
and foreign assets occurs. This redistribution of the portfolio investments leads to further 
changes in exchange rates. As an example of sterilization, when monetary authority in a country 
decides to sell domestic government bonds and buy domestic currency from the public to 
sterilize the impact of a foreign exchange buying intervention. It will result in domestic interest 
rates increasing and it will induce investors to buy more domestic bonds rather than foreign 
assets, resulting in depreciation of domestic currency. 
2.4 Channels of Foreign Exchange Interventions 
As we have already mentioned, there is a consensus regarding the impact and efficiency of 
nonsterilized interventions, whereas the efficiency of sterilized interventions is a controversial 
issue among economists. Doubt remains as to whether sterilized interventions can influence 
exchange rates in any meaningful way except through such channels as signalling; the portfolio-
balance channel is mostly accepted. Furthermore, Hung (1991 and 1997) postulated a new 
channel called noise-trading. 
2.4.1 Portfolio-Balance Channel 
Interventions may work through a portfolio-balance channel based on assumptions of the 
portfolio-balance approach. According to this approach, investors allocate their portfolios to 
balance exchange rate risk against expected rate of returns (Aguilar & Nydahl, 2000). In other 
words, investors diversify their portfolios amongst foreign and domestic assets based on 
expected return and on the variance of returns (Dominguez, 1998). Thus, a portfolio balance 
channel can only work if domestic and foreign assets are assumed as unable to substitute for each 
other. If they are perfect substitutes, investors will care only for the amount of total assets they 
owned instead of caring about the ratio of domestic and foreign assets to balance their portfolios. 
Therefore, portfolio-balance channel theory claims that these cannot be substituted for each other 
because of the exchange rate risk. For this reason, investors require a risk premium to hold a 
foreign asset. After interventions, since central banks will buy or sell domestic assets as part of a 
sterilized intervention, it will result in changes of supply of foreign and domestic assets in the 
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investor’s portfolio and so also change the existing balance in the portfolio. When investors try 
to create a balance among foreign and domestic investments in their portfolios, risk premiums 
will change, leading to changes in exchange rates.  
On the other hand, finding in previous studies disagree with respect to crucial 
assumptions in portfolio-balance theory as to foreign and domestic assets being perfect 
substitutes. Mussa (1979) contends that they can be substitutes whereas some other studies, such 
as Obstfeld (1990), provide supporting evidence for portfolio-balance theory. Schwartz (2000) 
states that there is no consensus regarding this assumption. 
2.4.2 Signalling Channel 
Whether domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes or not, sterilized interventions can 
impact on ER through a signalling channel (Mussa, 1981). The signalling channel is based on the 
assumption that central banks use foreign exchange market interventions to convey information 
about economic fundamentals to market participants. If market participants see interventions as 
signals indicating that, although today’s fundamentals do not change, future fundamentals are 
expected to change. This expectation leads market participants to revise their expectations of 
future spot exchange rates (Dominguez, 1998). In other words, intervention is used as a signal to 
give investors information regarding future monetary policy, which changes their expectations 
with regard to future policies. Thus, by changing expectations, central banks aim to influence 
exchange rates (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). 
The size of the impact of a sterilized intervention on ER through the signalling channel 
may exceed that of a nonsterilized intervention, depending on the nature of information the 
signal is meant to convey (Dominguez, 1998). If the intervention signal is credible and clear and 
if foreign exchange markets are efficient, interventions reduce volatility of foreign exchange 
rates or, at the very least, fail to influence variances in foreign exchange rates (Dominguez, 
1998). For instance, under these assumptions, an official intervention which is intended to 
convey a message about future contradictory monetary policy leads to the appreciation of the 
domestic currency without any impact on foreign exchange rate variance. In another scenario, it 
would result in a decrease in volatility of foreign exchange rate without impacting the level of 
foreign exchange rates. On the other hand, if it is not credible or is ambiguous, volatilities in 
foreign exchange rates will increase due to uncertainty (Dominguez, 1998). In recent years, the 
reason that central banks do not usually use secret interventions may be due to the desire of using 
signalling channel to influence foreign exchange rates (Agcaer, 2003).  




2.4.3 Noise-Trading Channel 
Hung (1997) introduced a new channel that he termed noise-trading for central bank 
interventions to affect ERs. The term, noise-trading, comes from the concept of noise trader first 
introduced by Kortian (1995), who defined a noise trader as a speculator in financial markets 
whose demand for currencies or any other assets is influenced by beliefs and sentiments which 
are not consistent with any economic fundamentals and theory. Hung (1997) states that central 
banks induce a noise trader to buy or sell a currency by entering a thin market. Hung argues that 
sterilized intervention may cause changes in speculators’ perception regarding a current trend in 
exchange rate movements; specifically, they can begin to view existing movements in foreign 
exchange rates as a reversal as they start to take the same position with intervention against a 
particular currency.  Therefore, effects of sterilized interventions on ERs can be longer and larger 
than usual sterilized interventions. 
The crucial point for using noise-trading channels is that central banks must be familiar 
with the reaction functions of speculators, and interventions should be implemented secretly by 
central banks.  




The Interventions in Advanced and 
Emerging Market Economies 
 
3.1 Advanced Economies 
During the Bretton Woods system, values of the currencies of member countries were 
determined in a fixed regime, and interventions were required when rates exceeded their pre-
determined parity bands (Dominguez, 1993). But in the period after the collapse of Bretton 
Woods, developed countries began to implement floating exchange rate regimes without 
interventions, or, stated in another way, intervention policy was left to the discretion of 
individual countries (Dominguez, 1993). Although under the floating exchange rate regime, we 
can expect that rates would be determined by supply and demand in international markets, most 
of the countries used interventions to impact value of their national currencies. In 1977, the IMF 
Executive Board provided its member countries with three principles intended to advise them 
regarding the usage of intervention policies. The first principle stated that countries should not 
manipulate exchange rates to gain unfair competitive advantage or prevent balance of payment 
adjustments; rather, they should use intervention policies to calm a disorderly foreign exchange 
market, and countries should respect the interests of other countries with respect to exchange 
rate.
4
 These principles imply that countries can use intervention policies to reduce exchange rate 
volatility. 
  During the 1970s, interventions in foreign exchange markets were observed frequently 
because high volatilities in ERs began to be observed. They were even higher than what 
policymakers and other market participants expected under the floating exchange rate regime. 
Then, in the beginning of the 1980s, as a result of the common view among policymakers, 
economists and other market participants concluded that intervention (especially sterilized 
intervention) is not an effective policy and has only a temporary effect on exchange rates. The 
U.S. stopped intervention in foreign exchange markets during 1981-1984. On the other hand, 
during the years in which U.S. policymakers abandoned interventions, other developed countries 
such as West Germany, Japan, and Canada continued to intervene in foreign exchange markets.  
                                                 
4
 IMF executive Board Decision no. 5392-(77/63), adopted April 1977. 
Chapter 3 The Interventions in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies 
18 
  
In the middle of 1985, the U.S. dollar appreciated by 40% against the mark and the U.S. trade 
deficit was about $100 billion. As a result of the 1985 G5 meeting, by an agreement known as 
the Plaza Agreement, the U.S. started to use interventions along with other G5 countries to 
depreciate the U.S. dollar. In 1986, against excessive depreciation of the dollar, the BOJ began to 
intervene to support the U.S. dollar. In the following year, 1987, the G7 countries decided to 
implement coordinated multilateral policies known as the Louvre Accord to reduce the high 
volatility of the U.S. dollar and restore equilibrium in current account balances (Baillie & 
Posterberg, 1997). During the 1990s, in advanced economies with the exception of Japan, there 
was a decreasing trend in the usage of foreign intervention policy relative to 1980s because of 
the new stability in exchange rates. The Bundesbank, which was one of the most active 
institutions in intervention operations during the 1980s, continued to intervene with great 
frequency until 1992. After that, the Bundesbank rarely tried to influence exchange rates and 
abandoned the practice of intervention as did U.S policymakers after 1995. The Bank of England 
also ceased interventions in 1993. Another developed country, Canada, stopped participating 
actively in the foreign exchange market. On the other hand, BoJ remained active in the foreign 
exchange markets by buying large volumes of U.S. dollars during the 1990s. In 1999, the 
European Central Bank was founded, and it became the leading authority regarding monetary 
decisions. In the same year, after the establishment of the new currency, the euro, excessive 
depreciation in the euro was observed. At this time, developed countries took joint actions to 
protect the value of the euro. During the 2000s, we rarely see foreign exchange interventions by 
central banks of industrialized countries, excluding Japan and the Swiss National Bank.  
3.2 Emerging Market Economies 
Nowadays, central banks in emerging countries frequently intervene in foreign exchange markets 
even when the amount of the intervention is large. Because of increased capital movements and 
especially rapid changes in capital over short time periods and increase in volume of global 
exchange markets, policymakers in emerging countries are more cautious to alleviate possible 
negative impacts on the economy such as uncertainty and high volatilities in exchange rates. The 
stability of exchange rates is still an important topic in the countries that lack credibility because 
of high-risk premiums when exchange rates are considered as an asset price. Furthermore, the 
stability of exchange rates influences the macro-economy of a particular country through various 
channels: Firstly, exchange rates can affect import prices and can therefore influence inflation 
via a pass-through mechanism. Also, since the exchange rate impacts export volume, it implicitly 
also influences growth and unemployment. Central banks which aim to reduce negative effects 
of short-term capital movements are forced to increase foreign currency reserves (Yeldan, 2001). 
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As a result, nowadays while developed countries that have efficient and credible markets rarely 
use intervention policy, developing countries frequently use interventions as a policy tool in 
foreign exchange markets. According to the literature (Canales-Kriljenko 2003, Table 2), in an 
IMF survey among the non-developed countries which are members of IMF, 91% of the 
participant countries declared that they intervened in foreign exchange market. Also, according 
to IMF (2010, pg. 24), 65% of its member have some sort of intervention data as proof of 
intervening in exchange markets. 
  Beside the fact that nowadays frequency and importance of interventions in emerging 
countries are higher than their usage and importance in advanced economies, Canales-Kriljenko 
(2003), based on the IMF’s 2001 Survey on Foreign Exchange Market Organization, suggests 
that interventions made by central banks in emerging economies are more effective than 
interventions by central banks in advanced economies. Caneles-Kriljenko (2003) states some 
possible reasons for the fact above: First of all, unlike central banks in developed countries, 
central banks in emerging market economies sometimes do not sterilize their foreign exchange 
market interventions.  Since previous studies showed that nonsterilized interventions influence 
exchange rates, we can expect that in those countries where interventions are not sterilized, 
foreign exchange interventions are effective. Also, institutional environments of the emerging or 
undeveloped countries where interventions occur are different from the ones in advanced 
economies. Central banks in emerging market economies have better conditions to control their 
exchange market because of their sheer size (Menkhoff, 2012). In advanced economies, 
especially in countries where three major currencies (USD, EUR, and JPY) are issued, even 
though central banks’ interventions are made in huge amounts in terms of absolute values, they 
still remain small with respect to total foreign exchange market turnover. However, in emerging 
market economies, central banks can conduct foreign exchange interventions in amounts that are 
important relative to total size of the foreign exchange market, the money base, and the stock of 
domestic bonds outstanding (Canales-Kriljenko, 2003). Moreover, unlike central banks in 
developed countries, central banks in some developing countries have a greater information 
advantage regarding the aggregate foreign exchange order flow through reporting requirements. 
In addition, central banks in such countries use foreign exchange and monetary regulations to 
increase their information advantage. Lastly, moral suasion can be used to increase the impacts 
of the interventions on exchange rates in emerging market economies. Agcaer (2003) also 
mentions that in developing countries, central banks generally are authorized to manage and 
control foreign exchange market transactions. They choose who will participate in exchange 
transactions under specified laws and regulations. Additionally, they oversee the actions made by 
market participants, and if a central bank views it as necessary, can remove market participants 
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or suspend the actions of a market agent. Therefore, foreign exchange interventions are effective 
and more important in an emerging country. 
  





In this chapter, as we present a brief history of monetary policy and exchange rate regimes in 
Turkey, we will be analyzing macroeconomic conditions and changes which led to crises and 
changes in policy and regimes in that country. Then, we will focus on the monetary policy of the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and activities including monetary policy 
decisions and foreign exchange rate interventions during our study period of 2005 to 2012.  
4.1 The Recent History of the Turkish Economy 
Until ten years ago, the Turkish economy was characterized by persistent high inflation. During 
the years preceding 2000, unstable growth performance, huge public deficits, and short-term 
capital flows attributable to political instability were observable. In addition, the importance of 
monetary policy was underestimated and fiscal policy prevailed for the public-sector borrowing 
requirements of the government. Under these circumstances, exchange rates tended to increase 
and fluctuate due primarily to high inflation. These were the main reasons for the occurrence of 
serious crises during the 1990s and the early 2000s. The Turkish economy suffered from serial 
financial and currency crises, such as that of 1994, resulting from the effects of the Asian and 
Russian crisis. The crises of November 2000 and February 2001 were the last and led to radical 
changes in both monetary policy and exchange rate regime.  
 During the 1990s, the macroeconomic environment of Turkey was shaped by high levels 
of inflation and unstable economic growth, since the main source of external finance for the 
government consisted of short-term capital flows. Furthermore, the banking sector, and in fact 
the entire financial sector were regulated insufficiently and were therefore vulnerable to rapid 
changes in capital movements. In addition to these weaknesses of the economy, the political 
system was also marked by instability, which further aggravated the economic situation. During 
the first half of the 1990s, CBRT pursued monetary targeting as a main policy under a crawling 
peg exchange rate regime. However, these circumstances led to a serious currency crisis in 1994, 
which resulted in devaluation of TRY against the USD by more than half. After the 1994 crisis, 
CBRT’s official monetary policy was still to sustain monetary and financial stability. In the years 
between 1995 and 1999, the exchange rate regime conducted by CBRT focused on achieving 
stability in financial markets (Gormez & Yilmaz, 2007). For this purpose, the crawling peg 
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regime was replaced by a managed float regime in which CBRT conducted an increasing number 
of interventions in the foreign exchange market. 
 Since, in the period following 1999, volatility of exchange rates together with persistent 
high level of inflation continued, the CBRT has focused primarily on the issue of inflation and 
volatility of exchange rates. Therefore, the CBRT planned to execute a three-year stabilization 
program supported by IMF in 2000. During the next three years, the main task of the CBRT 
would be to support this program, which was called Exchange Rate Based Stabilization (EBRS) 
Program. The aim of the EBRS Program was to achieve price and exchange rate stability. For 
this purpose, in 2000, the exchange rate basket was announced on a daily basis along with a 
Stand-by-Agreement with IMF. The exchange rate regime was transformed from managed 
floating to a sort of crawling peg regime, tablita regime, where daily announcement of the 
exchange rate basket was viewed as an anchor for inflation expectations. But, following the two 
financial crises in November 2000 and February 2001, policymakers decided to abandon the 
EBRS Program due to the rising costs of the pre-announced exchange rate regime was 
increasing. Gormez & Yilmaz (2007) list the reasons for this failure as follows: 
 Flaws in structure and arrangement of the stabilization program 
 Failures in execution of necessary reforms 
 Failure in execution of tight fiscal policy 
 Delays of  privatizations 
 The strength of the USD against the EUR 
 Jump in oil prices  
  After the financial crisis of February 2001, a new economic program called Transition 
Strong Economy Program was launched along with structural reforms aimed at reducing 
uncertainties in the financial markets and rebuilding financial and banking sectors. After the 
crisis, while monetary policies were also being switched to inflation-targeting ones, the main 
goal of CBRT was determined to be achieving and maintaining price stability. Also, CBRT 
decided to let exchange rates float. Under a floating exchange rate regime, through the new 
stabilization program, policymakers intended to stabilize the whole economy by decreasing 
inflation so as to achieve fiscal austerity together with a viable debt position and to have 
sustainable growth (Ozturk, 2006). Along with the floating exchange rate regime, CBRT stated 
that it would not affect the level of the exchange rate or change the long-run equilibrium levels 
of exchange rates and that it would intervene in foreign exchange markets only if excessive 
volatility were observed. In the period following 2001, discretionary interventions and foreign 
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exchange auctions have become the main tools in executing exchange rate policies.
5
 After 
February 2001, CBRT took several consecutive actions. First of all, it provided the banks with 
liquidity in terms of foreign currencies by employing methods of swap or direct selling foreign 
exchange currencies against TRY so that banks could meet their financial obligations and cover 
their short positions. At the end of March 2001, after  March 29, CBRT started to conduct pre-
announced (time and amount of the auction announced beforehand) selling auctions through 
which it aimed to smooth excessive short-term exchange rate fluctuations without affecting long-
run equilibrium levels of  exchange rates  and to  increase the transparency of foreign exchange 
sale transactions . During 2001, in total, US$ 6.5 billion were sold by the CBRT. In this same 
year, CBRT conducted only one buying auction, which was worth only US$ 47 million. 
By the beginning of 2002, an implicit inflation-targeting regime was implemented by 
CBRT and left in place until 2006 and short-term interest rates were employed as a monetary 
policy tool for the purpose of achieving price stability. Under the floating exchange rate regime, 
achieving exchange rate stability with minimum central bank interventions is a crucial target for 
inflation-targeting regimes (Ozturk, 2006). That is the main reason that CBRT conducted 
discretionary foreign exchange interventions at only three times in 2002 during which CBRT 
changed the form of the auctions from selling to buying. Although they were suspended from 
July 2002 to May 2003 because of political uncertainty, buying auctions became the primary tool 
with which CBRT intervened in foreign exchange markets. The buying auctions were motivated 
mostly by reverse currency substitution and increasing amounts of capital inflows. The buying 
auctions were conducted to serve the purpose of international reserve accumulation. During 2003 
and 2004, CBRT continued to conduct discretionary interventions and auctions only in the form 
of purchase, except for a small number of selling interventions during May 2004. Table 4.1 
provides a summary of the CBRT’s intervention transactions during the post-crisis period, 
including both discretionary interventions and pre-announced auctions. 
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  Interventions and auctions are conducted only in terms of USD in Turkey. 




Table 4.1: CBRT’s 2002-2004 Discretionary Interventions and Foreign 
Exchange (FX) Auctions in Millions USD)   








Total Net FX  
Transaction  
2002 795 - 16      12 +799 
2003 5,652 - 4,229 - +9,881 
2004 4,104 - 1,283 9 +5,378 
      
Total:     +16,058 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
The overall economic policy implemented by policymakers for the post-crisis period has 
been successful: First, the Turkish economy began to recover and then showed significant 
growth performance. Inflation rates showed downward trends. In this respect, we could say that 
the inflation-targeting policy was implemented successfully. Thus, the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy was improved without any pre-determined exchange rate targets. The public 
debt to GDP ratio also decreased. Following these positive impacts on the economy, especially 
the decreases in inflation, the dollarization effect through Turkish economy also declined 
(Ozturk, 2006), resulting in a decline in exchange rate pass-through impacts on domestic price 
levels. Therefore, new conditions determined further monetary policy decision making, including 
the exchange rate policy which began to adjust to the variation in both domestic and international 
markets (Ozturk, 2006).  
4.2 Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies between 2005-
2012 
  Since our study period covers the days between January 4, 2005 and December 31, 2012, 
we will focus on monetary and foreign exchange rate policies in the period between the years 
2005 and 2012. In this section, we will also present detailed information regarding interventions 
and auctions conducted during this study period. 
 In 2005, CBRT continued to implement implicit inflation targeting with a floating 
exchange rate regime. With the success of a stabilization program launched following the 
February 2001 crisis, the dollarization effect on the economy declined, resulting in 
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improvements in balance of payments together with an increasing supply of foreign currency 
while demand for foreign currency did not increase at the same rate or even declined.
6
 
Under the floating exchange rates, since equilibrium levels of exchange rates are 
determined by supply and demand of the market participants for foreign currencies, level of 
international reserves becomes unimportant. However, in economies, where government and 
private sectors hold huge amount of foreign currency debts, having a strong position in terms of 
international reserves can protect an economy from the negative effects of external shock or even 
internal shocks. Another reason for having high levels of international reserves is that having a 
good position in international reserves is viewed as increasing the credibility of the country. 
Therefore, CBRT pursued a moderate reserve accumulation policy. For this purpose, it started to 
conduct buying auctions in 2002 and continued in 2003, in 2004, and in 2005 as well. The total 
number of foreign exchange buying auctions in 2005 was 242, and these totaled US$ 6,900 
million. Under this moderate reserve accumulation policy, CBRT states that foreign exchange 
buying auctions are conducted only in times when increases in supplies of foreign currency are 
higher than increases in demand for this foreign currency. But, CBRT states that it does not have 
any target for exchange rate levels under the floating exchange rate regime. CBRT also states 
that it monitors foreign exchange markets and pays close attention to excessive volatility in 
exchange rates. Thus, it states, buying auctions can be suspended when excessive volatilities of 
exchange rates or unusual prices are observed in foreign exchange markets because of external 
shocks or unexpected events.  In addition, whenever excessive volatility is observed, CBRT 
would directly intervene with purchases or sales to eliminate excessive fluctuations in exchange 
rates. CBRT conducted six foreign exchange buying interventions during 2005 totaling US$ 
14,565 million. There were no foreign exchange selling interventions or auctions in 2005. 
In 2006, after the necessary conditions of a strong financial system and lowered inflation 
rates, which eliminated concerns about consistent fiscal discipline in fully implementing inflation 
targeting, were achieved, CBRT replaced the implicit inflation-targeting regime implemented in 
2002 with explicit inflation targeting. As in previous years, CBRT allowed the exchange rates to 
float. In a nutshell, the main policies regarding the interventions and auctions remained same. In 
the first months of 2006, CBRT continued to conduct pre-announced buying auctions. But, since 
excessive volatility was observed along with a disappearance of thickness in the foreign 
exchange markets on May 16, foreign exchange buying auctions were suspended till November 
10.  The total number of buying auctions in 2006 was 121. Also, CBRT conducted one buying 
intervention and three selling interventions to eliminate excessive volatilities in foreign exchange 
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rates. In addition to three selling intervention, after 2001 the first exchange rate selling auctions 
were conducted. CBRT conducted two selling auctions, each in the amount of US$ 1,000 
million.  
During the period between 2007 and 2010, there were no any monetary and exchange 
policy changes in Turkey. CBRT continued inflation-targeting as a monetary policy with the 
floating exchange rate regime. From 2007 to 2010, CBRT did not conduct any direct 
interventions while it used many foreign exchange auctions for very large amounts. The main 
reason for conducting foreign exchange buying auctions was a moderate reserves-accumulation 
policy under suitable conditions. The number of foreign exchange buying auctions was 240, 194, 
97, and 238 through the years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. Total amount of foreign 
currency purchased through foreign exchange buying auctions between 2007 and 2010 was US$ 
35,921 million. During this time, gross foreign currency reserves were increased from US$ 63 
billion to US$ 86 billion. But, in 2008 with the appearance of effects attributable to the global 
financial crisis, CBRT started to take precautions to alleviate the negative impacts of the crisis. 
For this purposes, it firstly decreased the amount of foreign currency purchased at auctions. 
Later, from October 2008 to August 2009, these buying auctions were suspended. By the 
beginning of August 2009, because of optimistic expectations regarding the global economy, 
recovery of liquidity conditions and an increase in risk seeking led to returning increases in 
capital flows to Turkey as in other emerging market countries. Besides increases in capital 
inflows, FX markets seemed to be again stable, and so, CBRT decided to again conduct buying 
auctions. Furthermore, between 2007 and 2010, CBRT continued to monitor foreign exchange 
markets closely as a general foreign exchange rate policy. In 2008 and 2009, CBRT employed 
selling auctions to forestall the negative effects of the global crisis by providing foreign currency 
liquidity. In October 2008, CBRT conducted two selling auctions which totaled US$ 100, and, 
from March to April 2009, 18 additional selling auctions were conducted totaling US$ 900. As a 
result of positive signs regarding recovery of the global economy, these were ended on April 2, 
2009. 
In 2011, under the floating exchange rate regime, CBRT continued to intervene in foreign 
exchange markets through foreign exchange buying and selling auctions. By the beginning of 
October 2010, CBRT had started to employ a flexible foreign exchange buying auction method 
under which CBRT abandoned the application of optional purchases. As a result of increasing 
concerns regarding sovereign debts of some European countries, capital inflows to emerging 
countries were reduced. Thus, CBRT firstly decreased gradually the amounts of foreign currency 
purchased by the auctions. Then, CBRT ceased buying auctions in July 2011 because of the 
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effects of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. By August 2011, CBRT started to conduct foreign 
exchange selling auctions to ensure that foreign exchange markets worked properly with 
sufficient liquidity conditions.  Also, CBRT intervened directly in foreign exchange markets in 
the form of sales after speculative transactions due to lack of market density were observed.  
CBRT continued to conduct both foreign exchange selling auctions and selling interventions in 
the first month of 2012, but did not use any foreign exchange buying transaction during this year. 
As a general framework regarding monetary and exchange rate policy between 04.01.2005 
and 31.12.2012, we can conclude for the following: 
 CBRT pursued an inflation-targeting regime as a monetary policy along with the 
floating exchange rate regime. In a floating exchange rate regime, exchange rates 
were employed neither a target nor as a policy tool. CBRT’s only target was 
inflation, and for this purpose short-term interest rates were employed. 
 Exchange rates are determined by supply and demand conditions in the foreign 
exchange market. Both supply and demand for foreign currencies are determined 
mainly by fiscal and monetary policies implemented, economic fundamentals, and 
international shocks or expectations. 
  






Figure 4.1: USD/TRY Exchange Rates (2005-2012) 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
As we can see from Figure 4.1, USD/TRY exchange rates were depreciated before the 
appearance of negative effects attributable to the global crisis. By the end of July 2008, the TRY 
suddenly started to lose its value against the USD. After that, the period between March 2009 
and May 2011 was relatively stable. But, after July 2011, TRY started to depreciate again against 
the USD until the end of 2011. By the beginning of 2012, USD/TRY foreign exchange rates 
depreciated and then became relatively stable during the year.  
 Although there is no any target for an equilibrium level of exchange rates, having 
sufficient international reserves alleviates negative impacts of unexpected events or 
shocks. Also, having a strong position in international reserves increases 
accountability of countries such as Turkey. Therefore, CBRT pursued a moderate 
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reserve accumulation policy. For this purpose, CBRT conducted pre-announced 
foreign exchange buying auctions whenever supply of foreign currencies was 
relatively higher than demand for them. 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
Figure 4.2: CBRT’s Gross International Reserves (including Gold Reserves, 2005 -2012; 
billion USD) 
 
As we can see from Figure 4.2, CBRT had increased its international reserves from US$ 
37.6 to 120.8 billion by December 21, 2012. One of the main tools for this reserve policy was 
foreign exchange buying auctions. Between 2005 and 2012, CBRT purchased a total of US$ 54.8 
billion solely through buying auctions. The point is that CBRT’s international reserves remained 
almost the same during the crisis periods such as the global crisis occurring between 2007 and 
2008 and the 2009 European debt crisis. 
 CBRT also conducted pre-announced foreign exchange selling auctions whenever 
unusual prices emerged depending on lack of market density. 
 CBRT stated that it closely monitors the foreign exchange markets and that it would 
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Table 4.2: Direct Interventions (Between 2005 and 2012, million USD) 




27.1.2005 1,347      - 
09.03.2005 2,361 - 
03.06.2005 2,056 - 
22.07.2005 2,366 - 
04.10.2005 3,271 - 
18.11.2005 3,164 - 
15.02.2006 5,441 - 
13.06.2006 -     494 
23.06.2006         -     763 
26.06.2006 -     848 
18.10.2011 -     525 
30.12.2011 -     1,865 
02.01.2012 -     525 
03.01.2012    -     326 
04.01.2012 -    155 
Total: 20,006    5501 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
 
Table 4.3: CBRT’s Discretionary Interventions and Foreign Exchange (FX) 
Auctions (2005-12; million USD)   








Total Net FX  
Transaction  
2005 7,442 - 14,565      - +22,007 
2006 4,296 1,000 5,441 2,105 +6,632 
2007 9,906 - - - +9,906 
2008 7,584 100 - - +7,484 
2009 4,314 900 - - +3,414 
2010 14,865 - - - +14,865 
2011 6,450 11,210 - 2,390 -7,150 
2012 - 1,450 - 1,006 -2,456 
Total:     +54,702 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
As we can see from Tables 4.2 and 4.3, CBRT conducted mostly purchase interventions or 
used foreign exchange buying auctions. The most frequently used tool was foreign exchange 
buying auctions during the period 2005-2012. In addition to number of usages, buying auctions 
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also dominated in amounts of US$. Especially, between 2007 and 2010, CBRT often conducted 
buying auctions whenever suitable market conditions prevailed. Also, while in the beginning of 
the study period, CBRT transactions in the form of purchases were dominant, at the end of the 
study period, both foreign exchange selling interventions and foreign exchange selling auctions 
prevailed. 
  





In this chapter, we will discuss findings of previous studies. Since many studies have been 
performed regarding central banks’ foreign exchange interventions, we divided and evaluated 
them according to purpose. Later on, we will briefly discuss studies concerning interventions in 
emerging countries and then present findings of studies that focused on CBRT interventions in 
Turkey. 
5.1 Studies on Channels of Foreign Exchange Interventions 
Broadly, studies that focused on channels of foreign exchange interventions concern portfolio-
balance and signalling channels.  
Studies in the 1970s and 1980s based on a portfolio-balance channel failed to detect 
statistical significance in the effects resulting from sterilized interventions. For instance, 
Henderson (1984) and Rogoff (1984) found no evidence to show that central bank interventions 
influenced foreign exchange rates through portfolio channel. Lewis (1988) also failed to show 
any significant impact of sterilized intervention on foreign exchange rates. The studies that do 
show a statistically significant impact conclude that this impact is small and temporary (Gosh, 
1992). The reason for these failures to show a statistically significant impact resulting from 
sterilized interventions via a portfolio-balance channel can be explained by the tremendous daily 
volume of foreign exchange. Thus, central banks cannot perform enough interventions to affect 
foreign exchange rates through the portfolio-balance channel (Froot& Obstfeld, 1989). However, 
studies in the 1990s showed some positive results in favor of a portfolio-balance channel. For 
example, Dominguez & Frankel (1993) show that US Federal Reserve Bank and Bundesbank 
interventions achieved effectiveness during the 1980s using a portfolio-balance mechanism. 
Also, many studies in the literature have been devoted to signalling channel. One is that 
of Dominguez (1992), who tried to discover whether or not 1977-1981 Fed interventions 
conveyed a message regarding future monetary policies or not. According to the study results, 
only some interventions in those years could be viewed as signals. Moreover, Kaminsky & 
Lewis (1993) failed to detect a relation between Fed interventions during the period from 1985 to 
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1990 and monetary policy during the same period. Fatum & Hutchison (1996) also suggest that 
Fed interventions do not include any message regarding monetary policy, even though they lead 
to higher volatility of foreign exchange rates. However, Hopkins & Murphy (1997) concluded 
that interventions performed by the Reserve Bank of Australia conveys signals regarding future 
possible changes in monetary policy. Another study, Dominguez & Frankel (1993), presents 
results indicating that interventions change expectations and can therefore impact foreign 
exchange rates. Similarly, Beine et al. (2002) reach the same conclusion with respect to the 
impact of interventions on expectations of market participants. 
5.2 Studies on Efficiency and Effects of Interventions on 
Foreign Exchange Rates 
Klein & Rosengren (1991) based their study on signalling hypothesis and suggest that effects of 
interventions on foreign exchange rates are transitory. Dominguez & Frankel (1993) base their 
study in a period from 1982 to 1988 and used simultaneous equations and regression models. 
They found that unexpected interventions are more effective on foreign exchange rates. Baillie & 
Osterberg (1997) analyzed Fed and Bundesbank interventions between 1985 and 1990 using the 
MGARCH model and failed to detect any significant impact of interventions on foreign 
exchange rates. Beine et al. (2002) studied Fed, BoJ, and Bundesbank interventions during 1985-
1995 and use the FIGARCH model. They found that buying interventions causes depreciation in 
foreign exchange rates. Fischer & Zurlinden (1986) studied interventions in Switzerland and 
suggest that interventions influence foreign exchange rates for a short time. In case of Japan 
during 1991-2000, Fatum & Hutchinson (2006) suggest that sterilized interventions affect short-
term foreign exchange rates but when interventions occur simultaneously with changes in 
interest rates, the effects of intervention disappear. 
5.3 Studies on the Relation between Foreign Exchange 
Volatility and Interventions 
Dominguez (1993) studies a period during 1985-1991 by employing GARCH models and shows 
that interventions of the Fed which are publicly known reduce volatility of foreign exchange 
rates while secret interventions increase volatility. Dominguez (1998) reached the same 
conclusion as the result of a study on 1977-1994 interventions of FED, Bundesbank, and BoJ. 
Bonser & Tanner (1996) tried to find a relationship between intervention policies of these same 
countries and volatility but for a different period, 1985-1999. Their findings show that 
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interventions increase volatility of foreign exchange rates. Chang & Taylor (1998) employed 
ARCH models for the case of Japan during 1992-1993 and found that effects of interventions are 
strong but short-lived and also causes volatility. Beattie & Fillion (1999) performed their study 
on Canada in the period between 1995 and 1997. They used GARCH and regression models. 
Their conclusions regarding interventions of the Bank of Canada were similar to those of 
Dominguez (1993). Thus, secret interventions have been shown to cause volatility while 
interventions which are publicly known have no impact on volatility. Galati & Melick (1999) 
suggest that interventions increase uncertainty regarding future exchange rates and therefore 
increase volatility of foreign exchange rates. Payne (2003) used an event study approach to show 
that interventions affect volatility and suggests that market participants respond to reported 
interventions quickly. For Japan during 1991-2001, Nagayasu (2004) used GARCH models to 
show that interventions influence foreign exchange rates and that the size of this influence is 
enlarged when several central banks coordinate interventions. Dominguez (2006) employed MA-
FIGARCH and ARFIMA models for interventions by FED, Bundesbank, and BoJ in the period 
between 1989 and 1995 and states that, although it is not clear whether interventions increase 
long-term volatility, strong effects of intervention on daily volatility of foreign exchange rates 
was detectable. Kim & Sheen (2006) used EGARCH models and suggest that efficiency of 
interventions can change from application to application, that coordinated interventions of two 
central banks are more effective, and that interventions not only increase volatility but also 
enhance volume of trade in the market. Hafner & Herwartz (2006) showed that exchange rate 
shocks enhance volatility of foreign exchange rates by using M-GARCH models for a period 
between 1979-1994 in the US, Germany, and the UK. Hwang & Stephen (2006) suggest that 
buying interventions are more influential on foreign exchange rates. Takeshi (2008) found that 
interventions reduce volatility, considered on a monthly base, using GARCH and EGARCH 
models for interventions of BoJ in the period 1991-2005. As opposed to other studies, Suardi 
(2008) used a TARCH model and suggested that direct interventions cause asymmetric volatility 
of foreign exchange rates. 
5.4 Studies on the Determinations of Interventions and 
Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates 
Andersen et al. (2003) found a strong correlation between foreign exchange rates and news 
related to interventions, and they suggest that intervention news increases volatility of foreign 
exchange rates. Brandorff et al. (2006) suggest that foreign exchange variances stem from 
interventions and announcements made by policymakers. Beine et al. (2007) employed ARFIMA 
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models to analyze interventions of FED, Bundesbank, BoJ during the period 1985-2004. They 
found that coordinated interventions by several central banks not only lead to large changes in 
movements of foreign exchange rates but also enhance continuity of volatility of these rates. 
5.5 Studies on Central Banks’ Interventions in Emerging 
Economies 
Even though foreign exchange interventions occur mostly in emerging countries, most studies 
have concerned intervention policies in advanced economies. Because of the different 
characteristics and properties of emerging countries with respect to exchange rate dynamics—
such as having unstable foreign exchange markets, a fragile financial sector, an ambiguous 
relation between exchange and interest rates, and frequent currency crises do not allow 
researchers to analyze a particular emerging country’s intervention policies (Akinci et al., 
2005a). However, in recent years, most studies have paid more attention to emerging market 
economies and their central bank transactions, such as their intervention policies. 
Unlike other studies, Scalia (2008) analyzes interventions in an emerging country, the 
Czech Republic, during a five-month period dating from July 2002 to December 2002. Through 
the use of simultaneous equation systems, interventions for depreciating CZK have become more 
influential.  Another study of interventions of the Czech national bank is Disyatat & Galati 
(2007), which suggests that interventions during 2001-2002 had a significant but small impact on 
sports rates. Disyatat & Galati (2007) also employ an event study approach and regression 
models to analyze the effect of interventions performed by the Czech National Bank during the 
period 2001-2002. They could find no evidence short-term volatility of foreign exchange rates. 
Also they state that interventions in their study period were mainly employed against 
appreciation of the CZK.  
Dominguez et al. (2010) analyzed implications of systematical reserve decumulation 
policy by Czech policymakers. Since reserve accumulation policy incurs the risk of valuation 
losses, Czech policymakers implemented systematic decumulation policy to mitigate valuation 
losses on euro-denominated assets. The study’s findings showed the results of decumulation in 
everyday results in the appreciation of the Czech Koruna relative to the Euro. Thus, 
decumulation policy was shown to have an impact on domestic currency even though the policy 
was not intended to influence the value of the Koruna relative to euro. 
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Employing the GARCH model, Gersl & Holub (2006) did not find any level of impact on 
EUR/CZK foreign exchange rates and concluded that volatility increases after interventions. 
Behera et al. (2008) found that interventions reduce volatility while having no impact level on 
the foreign exchange rate of USD/INR. Employing dummy variables to define interventions, 
Goyal & Arora (2010) found that interventions reduce volatility while also having some level of 
impact on USD/INR. 
5.6 Studies on Interventions in Turkey 
The number of studies and researches on interventions in Turkey is limited. However, in the last 
ten years, studies have begun to pay more attention to efficiency of central bank interventions in 
Turkey as for other emerging market countries. 
 The first study for the efficiency of intervention in Turkey was Domac & Mendoza 
(2001). The study analyzes the effects of FX auctions on volatility of FX rates for the period 
February 22, 2001 to May 30, 2002. E-GARCH model is employed for the purpose of 
distinguishing effect of buying and selling auctions on FX rates. They also use dummy variable 
for signalling future exchange policy. Also, overnight interest rates are used as monetary policy 
tools in their models. They found that FX auctions decreases volatility. In addition, the results 
suggest that while selling auctions reduces the volatilities, buying ones do not have any impact 
on volatility. Lastly, increases in interest rates result in decreases in exchange rate volatility.  
 For the same purpose, Agcaer (2003) analyzed the effects and efficiency of interventions 
occurring between February 2001 and November 2003, including direct interventions using 
EGARCH models. The effects of foreign exchange auctions and interventions have been 
investigated not only individually but also as a whole. Findings show that the presence of CBRT 
in foreign exchange markets matters. Both foreign exchange auctions and interventions 
positively affect the level and volatilities of foreign exchange rates. Also, buying interventions 
affects levels of foreign exchange rates while selling interventions does not have s significant 
impact on them. Guimaraes & Karacadag (2004) analyzed interventions in the period from 
March 29, 2001, to October 3, 2003, employing Asymmetric Component Threshold GARCH 
(ACT-GARCH) models. According to their results, selling and buying operations do not 
influence level of foreign exchange rates. While sales of foreign currency reduce volatility in the 
short term, they lead to increases in the volatility over longer time periods. 
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 Akinci et al. (2005a; 2005b) investigated the causes and efficiency of foreign exchange 
interventions in Turkey during the period between May 16, 2001, and December 31, 2003. 
Akinci et al. (2005a) employed probit analysis and Granger causality tests to determine the 
causes for the interventions in Turkey. The results suggest that volatility leads to interventions. 
Another finding is that, while there is a one-way causality between buying interventions and 
volatility, two-way causality exists between selling interventions and volatility. Akinci et al. 
(2005a) used the GARCH framework to analyze the effectiveness of interventions; their study 
found that large amounts of isolated buying interventions reduce volatility.  Akinci et al. (2005b) 
used an event study approach with a time-varying parameter model for the same purpose; their 
results suggest that buying interventions in the second half of 2003 were more effective than the 
one in the first half of 2003. 
 Herrera & Ozbay (2005) employed dynamic censored regression to analyze the effect of 
interventions. They suggest that that there is continuity in interventions, which can be a signal 
for future monetary policy changes. Tunay (2008) analyzes the period between January 4, 1999, 
and September 24, 2008, using ARFIMA-GARCH and ARFIMA-FIGARCH models and 
showed that interventions increase volatility of foreign exchange rates. 
  




Data & Methodology 
This chapter presents the data, methodology, and model formulation with which the study’s 
hypotheses are analyzed.  
6.1 Data Description 
This study covers a period between the years 2005 and 2012 in general and between 2007 and 
2010 in greater specificity. Data consists of daily values of   
   
   
, which represent selling 
exchange rates for those days. Total number of days is 2,015 days, excluding weekends and 
holidays, and direct interventions and foreign exchange auctions occurred within the period 
between January 4, 2005, and December 31, 2012. 
   
   
 is defined as the value of the US dollar in 
terms of the Turkish lira (TRY). Therefore, an increase in the exchange rate means that TRY is 
depreciated against USD. Therefore, while sales of USD against TRY result in the TRY 
appreciating in value, a purchase of USD against TRY results in the TRY being depreciated. 
However, the CBRT states that interventions and foreign exchange auctions conducted by it are 
not intended to impact the levels of exchange rates since it has no equilibrium target for these 
exchange rates. CBRT use direct interventions whenever there is excessive volatility because of 
speculation. It arranges foreign exchange buying auctions in order to maintain a strong 
international reserve and conducts selling auctions so as to ensure market participants liquidity in 
foreign currency markets. During the study period, since all interventions and auctions conducted 
by the CBRT were in terms of USD, we analyze effects of interventions and auctions only with 
respect to 
   
   
 exchange rates. 
Baille & Bollerslev (1989b) describe the series of nominal exchange rates as I (1) type 
process. In fact, time series of nominal exchange rates under the free float regime is considered 
to be generated from a non-stationary process, that is, the probability distribution governing this 
time series does not remain the same over time. Therefore, nominal daily foreign exchange rate 
returns must be transformed so as to create a stationary time series. To perform this 
transformation, we use daily differences in the log of exchange rates, as can be seen in Equation 
6.1: 
       =    (  ) =   (   )     (     )     (6.1) 
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Figure 6.1 displays the transformed data observed between 2005 and 2012. As can be 
seen, extreme volatility in the foreign exchange rate 
   
   
  was observed between 2008 and 2009, 
when the global financial crisis started to influence the world economy. 
 
Figure 6.1: Volatility in USD/TRY Series (Daily Differences of USD/TRY in Logarithm 
Form) 
 

















Std. Dev.   0.009110
Skewness  -0.182569
Kurtosis   22.63347
Jarque-Bera  32374.87
Probability  0.000000
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Figure 6.2 is a frequency distribution of the transformed exchange rates. As can be seen, 
the exchange rate log returns of 
   
   
 are left skewed and are fat tailed relative to the normal 
distribution. Log returns also shows excess kurtosis, and the Jarque-Bera statistical test rejects 
the null hypothesis that these are normally distributed. 
An important issue in any analysis of financial time series is that the data in the series are 
usually non-stationary. Therefore, before construction of a model, tests to determine whether a 
data series is stationary or not must be performed. Several such tests are available, and our study 
employed the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Phillips-Perron (PP), and the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests.  Both the ADF and PP test statistics test the null hypothesis 
that a series of log returns contains unit root, that is, that the characteristic function of the process 
contains the unit root 1. The KPSS statistical test, however, tests the null hypothesis that a series 
is stationary.  These tests were first conducted with only a constant term and then repeated with 
constant and trend terms.  
  




Table 6.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on USD/TRY Log Returns  
 Akaike  Info Criterion Schwarz Info Criterion 
With Constant -10.72* -44.35* 
With Constant and Trend -10.73* -44.34* 
 
Table 6.2: Phillips-Perron Test on USD/TRY Log Returns  
 PP Test Statistic 
With Constant -44.347* 
With Constant and Trend -44.340* 
(*): Significant at 1 % level 
Table 6.3: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin Test (KPSS) on USD/TRY Log 
Returns 
 
 KPSS Test Statistic 
With Constant 0.058* 
With Constant and Trend                  0.036* 
(*): Significant at 1 % level. 
As shown in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, the tests indicate that the data series of the log 
returns of  
   
   
  foreign exchange rates is stationary. 
In addition, we considered the overnight interest rate to be a primary tool in monetary 
policy. Under the inflation-targeting regime, the CBRT has started using short-term interest 
rates. In our study, since we also want to capture the effects of monetary policy on foreign 
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exchange rates, we try to capture the impact of any policy changes on these rates by examining 
changes in overnight interest rates during our study period.
7
 
 As can be seen from Figures 6.3 and 6.4, overnight interest rates tended to decrease over 
the study period. Important to note is a sharp decrease in borrowing and lending rates between 




Figure 6.3: Changes in Overnight Interest rates between 2005 and 2012 (Borrowing Rates) 
 
Figure 6.4: Changes in Overnight Interest rates between 2005 and 2012 (Lending Rates) 
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6.2 Methodology: Theoretical Framework of E-GARCH Model 
Most financial time series do not have constant means and variances. More specifically, most the 
financial series display relatively calm periods followed by period of high volatility or vice 
versa. Since the ARCH and GARCH family of models can capture low- and high-volatility 
periods, they are commonly used in the investigation of financial time series. One disadvantage 
of using the GARCH family of models is that analyses of time series using different models may 
yield different and complicated results. For this reasons, some researchers have turned to the 
event study approach in recent years (Agcaer, 2003). On the other hand, in foreign exchange rate 
volatility analyses, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) by Engle (1982) and 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) by Bollerslev (1986) have 
been shown to provide good fits for many exchange rate series (Ozturk, 2006). Also, the 
convenience and easy applicability of the GARCH family of methods is their most important 
advantage. In conclusion, GARCH and models derived from the standard GARCH model, such 
as FI-GARCH, E-GARCH, MGARCH, and etc., have been common methods used to analyze 
the effects of interventions on foreign exchange rates.  
In this study, E-GARCH models were employed to determine whether interventions of 
the CBRT during our study period influenced both the level and volatility of foreign exchange 
rates. In contrast to the standard GARCH model, the E-GARCH model allows us to distinguish 
the impacts of buying and selling operations on foreign exchange rates. Because standard 
GARCH models do not allow inclusion of negative values describing selling interventions, 
determining whether selling and buying operations impact level and volatility of foreign 
exchange rates differently. Since the E- GARCH model allows us to define selling interventions 
using negative values, comparison of the impacts of buying and selling operations on exchange 
rates is more feasible. Because of this advantage of the E-GARCH model, most recent studies 
focusing on the influence of central bank foreign exchange operations in Turkey employed E-
GARCH models. For instance, Domac & Mendoza (2002) used E-GARCH models to analyze 
the effects of foreign exchange auctions on foreign exchange rates, and the study results indicate 
that foreign exchange auctions do not increase volatility but that, in fact, only selling auctions 
reduce volatility. Agcaer (2003) used E-GARCH together with an event approach. Ozturk (2006) 
also employed both E-GARCH and standard GARCH models.  
The standard GARCH model assumes that negative and positive shocks of the same 
absolute values have the same impact on future conditional variances (Ozturk, 2006). In other 
words, the standard GARCH model neglects the ‘‘asymmetric” or ‘‘leverage effect,’’ which 
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states  that an unexpected drop tends to increase volatility more than does an unexpected increase 
having the same absolute value. On the other hand, an asymmetric effect is a property found in 
most financial time series, such as foreign exchange rate series. Therefore, Nelson (1991) added 
a term to the standard GARCH variance equation to capture the asymmetric effect. Exponential 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (E-GARCH) was first introduced by Nelson (1991). 
In contrast to the standard GARCH model, Nelson (1991) also employed the log transformed 
conditional variance to eliminate the restriction on the coefficient being positive. Equation 6.2 is 
the variance equation of the E- GARCH model: 
  (  
 ) =   ∑   (     
 
     [|    |   |    |])  ∑   
 
       
       (6.2) 
When     is greater than zero, the deviation of |    | from its expected value results in the 
variance of    being larger than otherwise, an effect similar to the idea underlying the standard 
GARCH. The term      multiplied by θ allows the sign of the errors to influence the value of the 
conditional variance. Also, multiplying |    | by γ captures a different size effect. When it comes 
to the leverage effect, the following are true: 
 If  θ = 0→ there is no leverage effect 
 If θ < 0 → there is a leverage effect 
 If -1 <  θ < 0→ positive shocks increase volatility less than do negative shocks 
      If θ < -1 → positive shocks decrease volatility while negative ones still increase 
it. 
In summary, the E-GARCH method has two main advantages: First, since      
   is 
included in the model,   
  is always positive although the parameters are negative. Second, the E- 
GARCH model accounts for the leverage effect, as mentioned above. 
 
6.3 Methodology: Models 
Central banks’ foreign exchange interventions aim to influence the level or volatility of foreign 
exchange rates or both at the same time. Usually, interventions are used to reduce volatility and 
change the level of exchange rates in a direction that policymakers want to see. Sometimes, 
although interventions on level of foreign exchange rates move rates in the direction desired, 
they might also increase volatility. Therefore, we distinguish the concept of ‘efficiency’ with 
respect to level and with respect to volatility. Since the CBRT states that it has no equilibrium 
target for foreign exchange rate level, the intervention operations and auctions conducted by the 
CBRT that are included in our study period should have no impact on the level of foreign 
exchange rates. On the other hand, the CBRT states that whenever excessive volatility occurs, it 
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is ready to act, in the form of direct interventions, to ease volatility. Thus, we can infer that a 
goal of the CBRT is to reduce volatility and, therefore, that direct interventions or auctions 
conducted by the CBRT should decrease volatility of foreign exchange rates.   
 In this study, we will first attempt to investigate effects of CBRT operations on foreign 
exchange markets, including interventions and foreign exchange auctions as a whole during the 
period between January 4, 2005, and December 31, 2012. For this purpose, this study will look at 
net size (i.e., magnitude) of operations carried out by the CBRT through interventions and 
auctions. In contrast to other studies focusing on Turkey, our study period covers a larger time 
period and includes the time preceding and during the global financial crisis and includes the 
European Debt Crisis. Additionally, from a more domestic viewpoint, our study period includes 
the explicit inflation-targeting regime which was launched in 2006. From these two perspectives, 
our study period is interesting in that it analyzes CBRT’s operations during a time of financial 
turmoil with an explicit inflation targeting regime. In contrast to Domac & Mendoza (2001), our 
study will also use direct interventions together with foreign exchange auctions so as to 
investigate the effects of all operations of the CBRT on foreign exchange rates. 
To sum up, our first hypothesis, based in part on the CBRT’s official statement, is that 
CBRT operations from January 4, 2005, and December 31, 2012, did not affect the equilibrium 
level of foreign exchange rates but did reduce volatility of foreign exchange rates. The model 
described by Equations 6.3 and 6.4 below formulate this first hypothesis. Specifically, Equation 
6.3 describes the model’s mean equation, and Equation 6.4 the model’s variance equation. 
Model 1: 
  =                     
           
         
          
           (6.3) 
  (  
 ) =    (|    |       )     (    
 )                   
           
         
   
       
                           (6.4) 
As a second area of interest, our study will attempt to investigate whether there is 
difference between selling and buying operations of the CBRT. Since the CBRT states that it can 
use direct interventions in the form of either purchases or sales when there is excessive 
volatility,
8
 we can assume that both types of transactions might have the same impact on foreign 
exchange volatility, including auctions with direct interventions. Thus, these operations should 
reduce volatility while not influencing foreign exchange rate level. More precisely, our second 
hypothesis is that there is no difference in impact of buying and selling transactions on foreign 
exchange rates. For the analysis of this hypothesis, we use the model below which consists of 
mean and variance equations, shown in Equations 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. 
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As a new contribution to existing literature concerning CBRT interventions, this study 
examines the influences of foreign exchange buying auctions on level and volatility of foreign 
exchange rates. As mentioned earlier, in the period between 2007 and 2010, CBRT mostly 
conducted foreign exchange buying auctions to increase international reserves under the 
moderate reserve accumulation policy pursued since 2002. CBRT therefore conducted 769 daily 
buying auctions as a total number of buying auctions. For this analysis, we focus only on foreign 
exchange buying auctions in the period between January 4, 2007, and December 31, 2010, in 
which CBRT purchased a total of US$ 35,921 million through buying auctions. The CBRT also 
increased its international reserve by US$ 22.7 billion from the end of 2006 to the end of 2010, 
although the global financial crisis led to a suspension in buying auctions between 2008 and 
2009. For this analysis, we also excluded selling auctions, which were conducted rarely relative 
to buying auctions in terms of total number and total size. Interestingly, the CBRT did not 
conduct any direct interventions despite the global financial crisis and the European Debt Crisis 
occurring in this same period.  
The CBRT conducted two pre-announced auctions to prevent disrupting the mechanism 
governing the floating exchange rate regime, in which exchange rate levels are determined by 
market participants. Based on the CBRT’s statement as to the purpose of conducting buying 
auctions, we can conclude, as our final hypothesis, that foreign exchange buying auctions did 
influence either level or volatility of foreign exchange rates while increasing international 
reserves. Model 3 below formulates our final hypothesis. 
Model 3:  
  =                     
           
         
          
        (6.7) 
  (  
 ) =    (|    |       )     (    
 )                   
           
         
   
       
             (6.8) 
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As we can see from all models, this study will attempt to investigate the impacts of 
monetary decisions or changes on foreign exchange rates by employing dummy variables for 
changes in overnight interest rates. In contrast to models presented in similar studies, we also 
include a dummy variable, denoted by    , in the models to capture the Monday effect in 
financial series. As a general belief, we expect that returns on Mondays are smaller than ones on 
Friday. The variables in our models and their definitions are as follows: 
    is defined as daily exchange rate returns, which is the standardized log difference of  
   
   
 , where 
   
   
 shows the value of TRY per one USD. 
 INTV is the standardized net amount of intervention in millions of US dollars on a day, 
including all direct interventions and auctions conducted on that day. 
       is a  dummy variable showing the presence of the CBRT on a particular day 
through interventions or auctions. Thus, it takes value of 1 when any central bank 
operation occurs in foreign exchange markets and when no intervention or auction occurs 
on a particular day. 
 PURCH defines the standardized values of the total amount of purchases in US dollars on 
a certain day, including both buying interventions and auctions. 
        is a dummy variable. It takes value of 1 when either a buying intervention or an 
auction is conducted on a particular day; otherwise it equals 0. 
 SALES defines the standardized values of total sales amounts US dollars on a day, 
including both selling interventions and auctions. 
        is a dummy variable. It takes a value of 1 when either selling intervention or 
auctions are conducted on a particular day; otherwise equals 0. 
 BAUC is a variable defining the standardized amount of purchases in US dollars via 
buying auctions on a particular day. 
       is the dummy variable, taking a value of 1 when a buying auction is conducted on 
a certain day and a 0 otherwise. 
      is another dummy, it stands for Mondays. 
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       is a dummy variable and functions as an indicator for a change in CBRT monetary 
policy. It takes a value of 1 when the CBRT increases overnight interest rates, and 0 
otherwise. 
         is a dummy variable functioning as an indicator for a change in monetary 
policy by the CBRT. It takes a value of 1 when the CBRT decreases overnight interest 
rates and value of 0 otherwise. 
Before presenting the study’s results, we would like to highlight some crucial points 
concerning our models and the way that the results were obtained. First, we use the 
standardized variables in our regression models because the amounts of interventions 
and auctions were large numbers in US dollar while daily exchange rates of USD/TRY 
which also defined in terms of TRY. Thus, we converted the variables which are daily 
exchange rates and amount variables, such as INTV, PURCH, SALES and BAUC, to 





Also, we estimate the models with robust standard errors to ensure accuracy of 
predictions of prediction of our models.
10
 More clearly, we employ robust standard 
errors so as to obtain proper statistical inferences of estimation results. 
  
                                                 
9
 Variables     were standardized as follows:   
  =
               (  )
                          (  )
. 
10
  See, for example, Engel (2001) and Bollerslev & Wooldridge (1992) for the details. 





In this chapter we present the results regarding the models presented in the previous chapter. In 
establishing the results of each model, we will also comment on the significance of the estimated 
model parameters. A significance level of 0.05 was selected for evaluation of parameters. 
Estimation results for Models 1, 2, and 3 are presented in Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3, respectively, 
which are presented on the following pages. 
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Table 7.1: The Results of Model 1  
 Mean Equation     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
   -0.005044 0.025607 -0.196958 0.8439 
      -0.013357 0.012048 -1.108692 0.2676 
       0.016317 0.032616 0.500286 0.6169 
      0.042208 0.035452 1.190581 0.2338 
    -0.275965 0.374591 -0.736708 0.4613 
      0.072220 0.095254 0.758188 0.4483 
Variance Equation    
ω -0.122359 0.045810 -2.671000 0.0076 
α 0.212932 0.037745 5.641287 0.0000 
  0.079925 0.021444 3.727085 0.0002 
  0.974969 0.009625 101.2980 0.0000 
      0.006476 0.014849 0.436113 0.6628 
       0.015812 0.013755 1.149576 0.2503 
      -0.310706 0.143375 -2.167082 0.0302 
    0.256723 0.233605 1.098962 0.2718 
      -0.111468 0.153600 -0.725706 0.4680 
   
  Akaike info criterion 2.423114 
     
  Schwarz criterion          2.464864  
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Table 7.2: The Results of Model 2  
Mean Equation     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
   -0.004138 0.025344 -0.163255 0.8703 
       0.001937 0.010958 0.176785 0.8597 
       -0.033394 0.015802 -2.113212 0.0346 
        0.006071 0.032336 0.187750 0.8511 
        0.100794 0.098500 1.023283 0.3062 
      0.042400 0.035851 1.182669 0.2369 
    -0.450666 0.305532 -1.475020 0.1402 
      0.072866 0.093405 0.780106 0.4353 
Variance Equation    
  -0.125712 0.045871 -2.740585 0.0061 
  0.213175 0.037463 5.690244 0.0000 
  0.077950 0.021638 3.602366 0.0003 
  0.977437 0.009315 104.9269 0.0000 
       0.023493 0.016240 1.446606 0.1480 
       -0.026653 0.009664 -2.757851 0.0058 
        0.009906 0.014554 0.680624 0.4961 
        -0.020388 0.034059 -0.598615 0.5494 
      -0.289044 0.143597 -2.012884 0.0441 
    0.016030 0.245948 0.065176 0.9480 
      -0.106822 0.153109 -0.697685 0.4854 
 
 
    Akaike info criterion 2.423051  
    Schwarz criterion 2.475934  
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Table 7.3: The Results of Model 3  




Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
   -0.017071 0.069467 -0.245746 0.8059 
      0.050032 0.037405 1.337570 0.1810 
       -0.070515 0.100865 -0.699107 0.4845 
      0.075436 0.062211 1.212585 0.2253 
    -0.451011 0.292170 -1.543660 0.1227 
      -0.043365 0.228772 -0.189558 0.8497 
 
 
Variance Equation    
    
  -0.087020 0.054828 -1.587136 0.1125 
  0.184620 0.059988 3.077588 0.0021 
  0.108040 0.030071 3.592786 0.0003 
  0.957727 0.026875 35.63672 0.0000 
      0.001693 0.009838 0.172064 0.8634 
       -0.010484 0.031432 -0.333534 0.7387 
      -0.246636 0.202363 -1.218782 0.2229 
    -0.199164 0.465135 -0.428185 0.6685 
      -0.018728 0.226015 -0.082861 0.9340 
   
    Akaike info criterion 2.771511 
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Beginning with the results of first model, we did not find any statistically significant 
impact of net amount of interventions and FX auctions as a whole on the level or on the volatility 
of FX rates. In addition, we did not find that the presence of CBRT in FX markets influences 
level or volatility of FX rates. The only significant coefficient belongs to the dummy variable 
used to capture Monday effect on the volatility of FX rates, while it is statistically insignificant 
in the mean equation. 
The results concerning the second model are interesting. In the mean regression, the 
amount of foreign currency purchases through direct interventions or foreign exchange buying 
auctions did not have any statistically significant impact on level of USD/TRY exchange rates. 
Similarly, this amount did not influence volatility of   D                           . Also, 
coefficients of dummy variable used to capture the impact of the presence of buying operations 
on level and volatility did not show any statistical significance.  
On the other hand, amount of sales by direct interventions or selling auctions was found 
to have a statistically significant impact on both level and volatility of USD/TRY foreign 
exchange rates. However, the coefficients of the dummy variables employed to capture the 
effects of selling operations in the foreign exchange rates market were not found to be 
statistically significant in the mean or in the variance equations. The Monday effect on federal 
exchange rates is statistically significant with respect to volatility of exchange rates as shown by 
the Model 1 results. 
In Model 3’s results, we do not see any statistically significant effect of both size and 
presence of foreign exchange buying auctions on level or volatility. In contrast to the results 
found with respect to the first two models, the Monday effect did not statistically affect the 
volatility of USD/TRY foreign exchange rates. 
According to the results of these three models, increase or decrease in overnight interest 
rates did not have any statistically significant impact on exchange rates. On the other hand, the 
GARCH and E-GARCH terms in the variance equations of all models are highly statistically 
significant.   
  





In this chapter, the results and significance or insignificance of the estimated coefficients are 
evaluated. Since this study investigates the impacts of the CBRT operation through direct 
interventions and auctions to show whether CBRT operations are effective or not along with 
CBRT’s official statements. 
As CBRT states that 
 It conducts direct interventions to reduce excessive volatility without influencing 
equilibrium level of FX rates,   
 It conducts FX buying auctions only to increase international reserves. Also it states that 
to not affect process of the floating exchange rate regime, auctions are pre-announced in 
terms of time and amount. 
 According to CBRT official statements and purposes about conducting direct 
interventions and FX auctions above, our findings show the following: 
 First of all, in our first model, effects of CBRT operations including both intervention 
and auction are investigated .The results show that, there is no any impact of CBRT operations 
on FX rates in terms of both amount of operations and presence of CBRT in FX market. 
 In our second model, our study analyzes any difference in selling and buying operations 
with respect to their impact on FX rates. We found that there is asymmetric effect between 
amount of selling and buying operation of CBRT on FX rates. While amounts of buying 
interventions and buying auctions as a whole did not influences exchange rate’s level or 
volatility, amount of selling interventions with selling auctions result in decreases in USD/TRY 
parity and volatility. That is, selling operations as whole increases the value of TRY against the 
USD. Also amount of selling operations reduces the volatility. 
 According to the results of model 3, FX buying auction does not influences level or 
volatility of FX rates. Along with CBRT statement about FX buying auctions, we can conclude 
that FX buying auction was an effective intervention policy during the period between 2007 and 
2010. 
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 Furthermore, the findings show that Monday effect is observed when considering its 
impact on volatility. During whole study period between 2005 and 2012, volatility tends to 
decrease on Mondays. In addition, our study tried to capture the effect of monetary policy 
changes on exchange rates through changes in overnight interest rates. The findings did not show 
that any monetary policy changes influences the exchange rates. 
 As a comparison with findings of similar studies on Turkey, our findings mainly depart 
from the findings of previous studies, although some minor similarities exist. For example, while 
Agcaer (2003) found that net amount of operations including intervention and auctions as a 
whole has a significant effect on exchange rate level and volatilities, our study did not show this. 
Similarly, Agcaer (2003) found that the presence of CBRT in FX market affects negatively the 
level and volatility of exchange rates. But, our results did not show any impact of the presence of 
CBRT on FX rates. Another difference from Agcaer (2003) is that our study shows that the 
amount of sales has a significant effect on the level and volatility by reducing both of them. But, 
in Agcaer (2003) the amount of selling has only a positive effect on the volatility. Differently, 
this study found that the presence of buying operation has a negative impact on the level of FX 
rates. As a similar point, Agcaer (2003) did not find any significant impact of amount of buying 
operations either on level or volatility. 
 In contrast to our findings, also Domac & Mendoza (2001) found that both size and 
frequency of central bank operations have positive impacts on the level of exchange rates and 
negative impacts on volatility. Also, this study suggests that both of size and frequency of selling 
operations have negative impacts on volatility but, our study shows that only amount or size of 
the sales has negative impact on it. Domac & Mendoza (2001) similarly found that amount of 
sales results in increase in value of TRY against USD and purchases of USD do not have any 
effect on exchange rates. 
 As a conclusion, our study brings new and different results in some points. Also, when 
considering the efficiency of the CBRT interventions and auctions during the period between 
2005 and 2012 as a whole, amounts of sales were effective with respect to volatility issues. Also 
FX buying auctions were served well for the purpose of increasing international reserves. 
  





After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System, developed countries continued to 
intervene in exchange markets until the middle of the 1990s. But in today’s world, foreign 
exchange interventions are used commonly and frequently in emerging market economies. The 
efficiency of interventions has high importance in the developing countries where the stability of 
exchange rates is still important. Because the stability of exchange rate influences the 
macroeconomy of the country through the various channels such as inflation, export, growth and 
even unemployment rate. In addition, the impact of the exchange rate fluctuation on the real 
economy, stability of exchange rate is also important in a country which lacks of accountability 
because the country can suffer a lot from the high risk premiums. Therefore, our study 
investigates the efficiency of interventions in Turkey between 4.1.2005 and 31.12.2012.  
Also our study period covers crucial crises times such as the global financial crisis and 
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. In this respect, it is interesting to analyze the effects of the 
interventions on exchange rates in Turkey on this period as a whole and on a sub-period which 
covers the period between 4.1.2007 and 31.12.2010.  
The findings of this study are that only the amount of sales of US dollars has an impact 
on the exchange rates. Since it causes to decreases in USD/TRY parity while it leads to the 
appreciation of TRY. In addition to decreases in level of exchange rates, amount of selling 
transactions reduces the volatility. Also, FX buying auctions in the period between 4.1.2007 and 
31.12.2010 did not influence either level or volatility. In this respect, they were an efficient tool 
to increase international reserves since CBRT conducts FX buying auctions for the moderate 
reserve accumulation policy.  
In conclusion, size of selling transactions of CBRT decreased the volatility. CBRT states 
that it takes the action when excessive volatility is observed and it tries to reduce excessive 
volatility. Therefore, CBRT can use selling interventions by increases in amounts of sales for 
volatility issue but CBRT must also notice that the amount of selling transaction leads to the 
appreciation of TRY. Furthermore, CBRT use pre-announced FX buying auctions in order to not 
disrupt the mechanism of floating exchange rate regime. These buying auctions conducted to 
increase international reserves. In our sub-period, buying auctions can be considered as an 
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effective policy for the purpose of the reserve accumulation without any impact on level or 
volatility of exchange rates. 
The efficiency of interventions will remain open for further research especially for 
researches focused on emerging market economies or developing countries. Because there is a 
limited number of studies have been made on interventions in developing countries. Also, since 
there are different results for different countries or even for the same country in different periods, 
researchers are motivated to study on the efficiency of the central bank foreign exchange 
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Appendix A: The Regression Outputs 
Appendix A1: The Results of Model 1 
Dependent Variable: R   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 12/15/13   Time: 16:40   
Sample: 1 2015    
Included observations: 2015   
Convergence achieved after 56 iterations  
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors & covariance 
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
LOG(GARCH) = C(7) + C(8)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + C(9) 
        *RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(10)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) + C(11) 
        *INTV + C(12)*DINTV + C(13)*MON + C(14)*ONUP + C(15)*ONDOWN 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.005044 0.025607 -0.196958 0.8439 
INTV -0.013357 0.012048 -1.108692 0.2676 
DINTV 0.016317 0.032616 0.500286 0.6169 
MON 0.042208 0.035452 1.190581 0.2338 
ONUP -0.275965 0.374591 -0.736708 0.4613 
ONDOWN 0.072220 0.095254 0.758188 0.4483 
     
     
 Variance Equation   
     
     
C(7) -0.122359 0.045810 -2.671000 0.0076 
C(8) 0.212932 0.037745 5.641287 0.0000 
C(9) 0.079925 0.021444 3.727085 0.0002 
C(10) 0.974969 0.009625 101.2980 0.0000 
C(11) 0.006476 0.014849 0.436113 0.6628 
C(12) 0.015812 0.013755 1.149576 0.2503 
C(13) -0.310706 0.143375 -2.167082 0.0302 
C(14) 0.256723 0.233605 1.098962 0.2718 
C(15) -0.111468 0.153600 -0.725706 0.4680 
     
     
R-squared 0.001364    Mean dependent var 0.015700 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001121    S.D. dependent var 1.000000 
S.E. of regression 1.000561    Akaike info criterion 2.423114 
Sum squared resid 2011.253    Schwarz criterion 2.464864 
Log likelihood -2426.287    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.438438 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.980873    
     
     




Appendix A2: The Results of Model 2  
Dependent Variable: R   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 12/15/13   Time: 16:57   
Sample: 1 2015    
Included observations: 2015   
Convergence achieved after 78 iterations  
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors & covariance 
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
LOG(GARCH) = C(9) + C(10)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + C(11) 
        *RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(12)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) + C(13) 
        *PURCH + C(14)*DPURCH + C(15)*SALES + C(16)*DSALES + C(17) 
        *MON + C(18)*ONUP + C(19)*ONDOWN  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.004138 0.025344 -0.163255 0.8703 
PURCH 0.001937 0.010958 0.176785 0.8597 
DPURCH 0.006071 0.032336 0.187750 0.8511 
SALES -0.033394 0.015802 -2.113212 0.0346 
DSALES 0.100794 0.098500 1.023283 0.3062 
MON 0.042400 0.035851 1.182669 0.2369 
ONUP -0.450666 0.305532 -1.475020 0.1402 
ONDOWN 0.072866 0.093405 0.780106 0.4353 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C(9) -0.125712 0.045871 -2.740585 0.0061 
C(10) 0.213175 0.037463 5.690244 0.0000 
C(11) 0.077950 0.021638 3.602366 0.0003 
C(12) 0.977437 0.009315 104.9269 0.0000 
C(13) 0.023493 0.016240 1.446606 0.1480 
C(14) 0.009906 0.014554 0.680624 0.4961 
C(15) -0.026653 0.009664 -2.757851 0.0058 
C(16) -0.020388 0.034059 -0.598615 0.5494 
C(17) -0.289044 0.143597 -2.012884 0.0441 
C(18) 0.016030 0.245948 0.065176 0.9480 
C(19) -0.106822 0.153109 -0.697685 0.4854 
     
     R-squared 0.002555    Mean dependent var 0.015700 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000924    S.D. dependent var 1.000000 
S.E. of regression 1.000462    Akaike info criterion 2.423051 
Sum squared resid 2008.854    Schwarz criterion 2.475934 
Log likelihood -2422.224    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.442461 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.983439    
     








Appendix A3: The Results of Model 3 
Dependent Variable: RETURNS   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 12/15/13   Time: 17:10   
Sample: 1 1005    
Included observations: 1005   
Convergence achieved after 98 iterations  
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors & covariance 
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
LOG(GARCH) = C(7) + C(8)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + C(9) 
        *RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(10)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) + C(11) 
        *BAUC + C(12)*DBAUC + C(13)*MONDAY + C(14)*ONUP + C(15) 
        *ONDOWN   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.017071 0.069467 -0.245746 0.8059 
BAUC 0.050032 0.037405 1.337570 0.1810 
DBAUC -0.070515 0.100865 -0.699107 0.4845 
MONDAY 0.075436 0.062211 1.212585 0.2253 
ONUP -0.451011 0.292170 -1.543660 0.1227 
ONDOWN -0.043365 0.228772 -0.189558 0.8497 
     
     
 Variance Equation   
     
     
C(7) -0.087020 0.054828 -1.587136 0.1125 
C(8) 0.184620 0.059988 3.077588 0.0021 
C(9) 0.108040 0.030071 3.592786 0.0003 
C(10) 0.957727 0.026875 35.63672 0.0000 
C(11) 0.001693 0.009838 0.172064 0.8634 
C(12) -0.010484 0.031432 -0.333534 0.7387 
C(13) -0.246636 0.202363 -1.218782 0.2229 
C(14) -0.199164 0.465135 -0.428185 0.6685 
C(15) -0.018728 0.226015 -0.082861 0.9340 
     
     
R-squared 0.001626    Mean dependent var 0.009822 
Adjusted R-squared -0.003371    S.D. dependent var 1.168674 
S.E. of regression 1.170643    Akaike info criterion 2.771511 
Sum squared resid 1369.034    Schwarz criterion 2.844836 
Log likelihood -1377.684    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.799373 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.969293    
     







Appendix A4: Unit Root Tests 
Appendix A4.1: ADF Test Results with Constant 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -44.35072  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.433398  
 5% level  -2.862773  
 10% level  -2.567473  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DLNFX)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/05/14   Time: 17:08   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2015   
Included observations: 2014 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DLNFX(-1) -0.988681 0.022292 -44.35072 0.0000 
C 0.000141 0.000203 0.692755 0.4885 
     
     R-squared 0.494344    Mean dependent var -8.59E-07 
Adjusted R-squared 0.494092    S.D. dependent var 0.012813 
S.E. of regression 0.009114    Akaike info criterion -6.557055 
Sum squared resid 0.167121    Schwarz criterion -6.551486 
Log likelihood 6604.954    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.555011 
F-statistic 1966.987    Durbin-Watson stat 2.000259 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     












Appendix A4.2: ADF Test Results with Trend and Constant 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=25) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -44.34324  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962605  
 5% level  -3.412041  
 10% level  -3.127931  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DLNFX)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/05/14   Time: 17:12   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2015   
Included observations: 2014 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DLNFX(-1) -0.988760 0.022298 -44.34324 0.0000 
C 4.23E-07 0.000406 0.001040 0.9992 
@TREND(1) 1.39E-07 3.49E-07 0.398545 0.6903 
     
     R-squared 0.494384    Mean dependent var -8.59E-07 
Adjusted R-squared 0.493881    S.D. dependent var 0.012813 
S.E. of regression 0.009116    Akaike info criterion -6.556141 
Sum squared resid 0.167107    Schwarz criterion -6.547788 
Log likelihood 6605.034    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.553075 
F-statistic 983.1615    Durbin-Watson stat 2.000257 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
















Appendix A4.3: ADF Test Results with Constant 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 14 (Automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=25) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.72753  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.433420  
 5% level  -2.862783  
 10% level  -2.567478  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DLNFX)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/05/14   Time: 17:13   
Sample (adjusted): 16 2015   
Included observations: 2000 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DLNFX(-1) -0.922374 0.085982 -10.72753 0.0000 
D(DLNFX(-1)) -0.066103 0.083727 -0.789517 0.4299 
D(DLNFX(-2)) -0.052085 0.080742 -0.645085 0.5189 
D(DLNFX(-3)) -0.032856 0.077411 -0.424427 0.6713 
D(DLNFX(-4)) -0.016708 0.073898 -0.226103 0.8211 
D(DLNFX(-5)) -0.064040 0.070133 -0.913125 0.3613 
D(DLNFX(-6)) -0.095050 0.066042 -1.439233 0.1502 
D(DLNFX(-7)) -0.085930 0.061977 -1.386493 0.1658 
D(DLNFX(-8)) -0.097435 0.057734 -1.687660 0.0916 
D(DLNFX(-9)) -0.132104 0.053087 -2.488458 0.0129 
D(DLNFX(-10)) -0.116723 0.048372 -2.413016 0.0159 
D(DLNFX(-11)) -0.105969 0.043623 -2.429199 0.0152 
D(DLNFX(-12)) -0.101153 0.038092 -2.655514 0.0080 
D(DLNFX(-13)) -0.066643 0.031351 -2.125709 0.0337 
D(DLNFX(-14)) 0.046988 0.022303 2.106825 0.0353 
C 0.000136 0.000202 0.673736 0.5006 
     
     R-squared 0.506308    Mean dependent var 2.57E-06 
Adjusted R-squared 0.502575    S.D. dependent var 0.012782 
S.E. of regression 0.009015    Akaike info criterion -6.571886 
Sum squared resid 0.161240    Schwarz criterion -6.527078 
Log likelihood 6587.886    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.555433 
F-statistic 135.6464    Durbin-Watson stat 2.001643 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     








Appendix A4.4: ADF Test Results with Trend and Constant 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 14 (Automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=25) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.73013  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962637  
 5% level  -3.412056  
 10% level  -3.127940  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DLNFX)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/05/14   Time: 17:14   
Sample (adjusted): 16 2015   
Included observations: 2000 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DLNFX(-1) -0.923529 0.086069 -10.73013 0.0000 
D(DLNFX(-1)) -0.065008 0.083808 -0.775674 0.4380 
D(DLNFX(-2)) -0.051059 0.080817 -0.631782 0.5276 
D(DLNFX(-3)) -0.031901 0.077480 -0.411729 0.6806 
D(DLNFX(-4)) -0.015822 0.073960 -0.213927 0.8306 
D(DLNFX(-5)) -0.063230 0.070189 -0.900853 0.3678 
D(DLNFX(-6)) -0.094317 0.066092 -1.427050 0.1537 
D(DLNFX(-7)) -0.085283 0.062020 -1.375092 0.1693 
D(DLNFX(-8)) -0.096873 0.057771 -1.676858 0.0937 
D(DLNFX(-9)) -0.131633 0.053117 -2.478181 0.0133 
D(DLNFX(-10)) -0.116338 0.048396 -2.403860 0.0163 
D(DLNFX(-11)) -0.105680 0.043641 -2.421559 0.0155 
D(DLNFX(-12)) -0.100949 0.038105 -2.649221 0.0081 
D(DLNFX(-13)) -0.066509 0.031360 -2.120806 0.0341 
D(DLNFX(-14)) 0.047051 0.022309 2.109111 0.0351 
C 1.61E-05 0.000408 0.039592 0.9684 
@TREND(1) 1.18E-07 3.50E-07 0.338596 0.7349 
     
     R-squared 0.506336    Mean dependent var 2.57E-06 
Adjusted R-squared 0.502353    S.D. dependent var 0.012782 
S.E. of regression 0.009017    Akaike info criterion -6.570943 
Sum squared resid 0.161231    Schwarz criterion -6.523336 
Log likelihood 6587.943    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.553463 
F-statistic 127.1190    Durbin-Watson stat 2.001643 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     






Appendix A4.5: PP Test Results with Constant 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 9 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -44.34763  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.433398  
 5% level  -2.862773  
 10% level  -2.567473  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  8.30E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  8.10E-05 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(DLNFX)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/05/14   Time: 17:15   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2015   
Included observations: 2014 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DLNFX(-1) -0.988681 0.022292 -44.35072 0.0000 
C 0.000141 0.000203 0.692755 0.4885 
     
     R-squared 0.494344    Mean dependent var -8.59E-07 
Adjusted R-squared 0.494092    S.D. dependent var 0.012813 
S.E. of regression 0.009114    Akaike info criterion -6.557055 
Sum squared resid 0.167121    Schwarz criterion -6.551486 
Log likelihood 6604.954    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.555011 
F-statistic 1966.987    Durbin-Watson stat 2.000259 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     














Appendix A4.6: PP Test Results with Trend and Constant 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 9 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -44.34007  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.962605  
 5% level  -3.412041  
 10% level  -3.127931  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  8.30E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  8.09E-05 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(DLNFX)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/05/14   Time: 17:16   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2015   
Included observations: 2014 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DLNFX(-1) -0.988760 0.022298 -44.34324 0.0000 
C 4.23E-07 0.000406 0.001040 0.9992 
@TREND(1) 1.39E-07 3.49E-07 0.398545 0.6903 
     
     R-squared 0.494384    Mean dependent var -8.59E-07 
Adjusted R-squared 0.493881    S.D. dependent var 0.012813 
S.E. of regression 0.009116    Akaike info criterion -6.556141 
Sum squared resid 0.167107    Schwarz criterion -6.547788 
Log likelihood 6605.034    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.553075 
F-statistic 983.1615    Durbin-Watson stat 2.000257 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     












Appendix A4.7: KPSS Test Results with Constant 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX is stationary  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 9 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
         LM-Stat. 
     
     Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic  0.058119 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level   0.739000 
  5% level   0.463000 
  10% level   0.347000 
     
     *Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  8.29E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  8.26E-05 
     
          
     
KPSS Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: DLNFX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/05/14   Time: 17:17   
Sample: 1 2015    
Included observations: 2015   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.000143 0.000203 0.704767 0.4810 
     
     R-squared 0.000000    Mean dependent var 0.000143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000000    S.D. dependent var 0.009110 
S.E. of regression 0.009110    Akaike info criterion -6.558405 
Sum squared resid 0.167144    Schwarz criterion -6.555621 
Log likelihood 6608.593    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.557383 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.977350    
     















Appendix A4.8: KPSS Test Results with Trend and Constant 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX is 
stationary  
Exogenous: 
Constant   
Bandwidth: 9 (Newey-West automatic) 
using Bartlett kernel 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLNFX is stationary  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 9 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
         LM-Stat. 
     
     Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic  0.036946 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level   0.216000 
  5% level   0.146000 
  10% level   0.119000 
     
     *Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  8.29E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  8.26E-05 
     
          
     
KPSS Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: DLNFX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/05/14   Time: 17:18   
Sample: 1 2015    
Included observations: 2015   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.56E-06 0.000406 0.008761 0.9930 
@TREND(1) 1.39E-07 3.49E-07 0.396897 0.6915 
     
     R-squared 0.000078    Mean dependent var 0.000143 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000418    S.D. dependent var 0.009110 
S.E. of regression 0.009112    Akaike info criterion -6.557490 
Sum squared resid 0.167131    Schwarz criterion -6.551924 
Log likelihood 6608.672    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.555447 
F-statistic 0.157527    Durbin-Watson stat 1.977505 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.691485    
     








Appendix B: Tables 
Appendix B1: Overnight Interest Rates between 2005 and 
2012 
Date Lending Borrowing 
11.01.05 21 17 
09.02.05 20.5 16.5 
09.03.05 19.5 15.5 
11.04.05 19 15 
10.05.05 18.5 14.5 
09.06.05 18.25 14.25 
11.10.05 18 14 
09.11.05 17.75 13.75 
09.12.05 17.5 13.5 
02.01.06 16.5 13.5 
28.04.06 16.25 13.25 
08.06.06 18 15 
26.06.06 20.25 17.25 
28.06.06 22.25 17.25 
21.07.06 22.5 17.5 
14.09.07 22.25 17.25 
17.10.07 21.5 16.75 
15.11.07 20.75 16.25 
14.12.07 20 15.75 
18.01.08 19.5 15.5 
15.02.08 19.25 15.25 
16.05.08 19.75 15.75 
17.06.08 20.25 16.25 
18.07.08 20.25 16.75 
23.10.08 19.75 16.75 
20.11.08 18.75 16.25 
19.12.08 17.5 15 
16.01.09 15.5 13 
20.02.09 14 11.5 
20.03.09 13 10.5 
17.04.09 12.25 9.75 
15.05.09 11.75 9.25 
17.06.09 11.25 8.75 




19.08.09 10.25 7.75 
18.09.09 9.75 7.25 
16.10.09 9.25 6.75 
20.11.09 9 6.5 
17.09.10 8.75 6.25 
15.10.10 8.75 5.75 
12.11.10 8.75 1.75 
17.12.10 9 1.5 
05.08.11 9 5 
21.10.11 12.5 5 
22.02.12 11.5 5 
19.09.12 10 5 
19.10.12 9.5 5 
21.11.12 9 5 
23.01.13 8.75 4.75 
20.02.13 8.5 4.5 
27.03.13 7.5 4.5 
17.04.13 7 4 
17.05.13 6.5 3.5 
24.07.13 7.25 3.5 
21.08.13 7.75 3.5 
 
